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 I. WHAT DOES THE THEORY HAVE TO SAY ABOUT THE CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS?
Civilian supremacy is taken for granted especially in Western liberal democratic 
states. In other words, there is an assumption that the military should be subordinated to 
the civilian rule. Military is expected to accept civilian rule unconditionally in a 
consolidated democracy. As a result, any regime that has a reserved place for the military 
is thought to fall short of complete democracy. However, among such assumptions one 
question seems to go unnoticed: Why would the military be subordinated to the civilians 
since the military has the means to control the society? Answers to this essential question 
structure the nature of the civil-military relations literature. 
As Peter D. Feaver (1999) points out the question ‘‘who will guard the 
guardians?’’ is the central dilemma of the civil-military relations subfield. The question is 
the result of a very plausible reasoning. As Feaver (1999) states ‘‘the very institution 
created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity.’’ 
After all, soldiers have the arms. As Eric Nordlinger (1977, p.5) states ‘‘although guns 
are only fired in a small proportion of coups, there is always the possibility that they may 
be, and they are always in the foreground as forceful threats.’’ Since the military needs to 
be strong enough to deter enemies and fight wars when necessary, it is not reasonable to 
keep the army vulnerable. Nevertheless the more autonomous and powerful the military 
is the more difficult to sustain civilian supremacy. Predictably the following questions 
emerge as Feaver (1997) points out: ‘‘Even if the military does not destroy society, will it 
obey its civilian masters, or will it use its considerable power to resist civilian direction 
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and pursue its own interests?’’ His suggestion to ‘‘make the government strong enough to 
protect the citizens, but not so strong as to become tyrannical’’ (1997) seems like the 
ideal goal for every polity. Since there is often a gap between the ideal and practice as 
Michael Desch (1998, p.391) states ‘‘the best indicator of the strength of civilian control 
is who prevails when civilian and military preferences diverge.’’ Because civilians are 
elected and are accountable to public they should be superior to the appointed soldiers in 
an ideal modern state. As Feaver (1997) states ‘‘the hierarchy of de jure authority favors 
civilians over the military, even in cases where the underlying distribution of de facto 
power favors the military. Regardless of how strong the military is, civilians are supposed 
to remain the political masters’’ (1997). In a democratic regime ‘‘the military assesses the 
risk, the civilians judge it’’ (1997) The prerogative to make the ultimate decision is given 
to them by the people. In other words as Feaver (1997) says ‘‘civilians have a right to be 
wrong.’’  
However, the fact that civilians are accountable for their mistakes would make 
them more cautious than the appointed ones. Yet ‘‘the protection by the military and 
from the military are in tension because efforts to assure one complicates the other’’ as 
Feaver (1997) summarizes the dilemma in an imperfect world.  
 Feaver (1997) points out that traditionally, ‘‘civil-military relations theory has 
focused on the direct seizure of political power by the military. Coups are the traditional 
focus of civil-military relations, because they so dramatically symbolize the central 
problem of the military exploiting their coercive strength to displace civilian rulers’’ 
(1997).However, for Feaver (1997), looking only at coups can underestimate military 
influence. A coup may indicate military strength, at least compared to the other political 
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actors the military suppresses. But it can also indicate military weakness, reflecting the 
military’s inability to get what it wants through the normal political process (1997). 
Especially the last part of his statement provides an alternative and insightful perspective 
since coups are usually considered manifestations of military’s power. 
Feaver (1997) says that the end of the Cold War has sparked a renaissance of 
attention to civil-military relations in the US. The most well known studies are Samuel 
Huntington’s The Soldier and the State (1957) and Morris Janowitz’s The Professional 
Soldier (1960). Feaver (1997) thinks that ‘‘because the coup/no-coup dichotomy misses 
much of the interesting give and take in the civil-military relations, some theorists have 
preferred to study military influence instead’’ (1997). For example, for Huntington (1959, 
p.20) ‘‘the problem in the modern state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert 
to the politician. The cleavage between the military and civilian spheres and the resulting 
tension between the two are phenomena of distinctly recent origin.’’  Huntington’s two 
classic works touching on civil-military relations constitute something of a debate 
between explanatory variables; his early work (The Soldier and the State italics mine) 
emphasizes a military factor, namely the degree of professionalism in the officer corps, 
and his later work (Political Order in Changing Societies italics mine) emphasizes a 
civilian factor, namely the degree of institutionalization within civilian society as Feaver 
(1997) summarizes. According to Huntington (1959, p.7) professionalism distinguishes 
the military officer today from the warriors of previous ages. Consequently, for him 
(1959, p.79) civilian control is essential to military professionalism because the military 
ethic emphasizes it. Huntington states that there are two types of civilian control and 
hence two ways to attain them: Subjective civilian control and objective civilian control.  
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According to Huntington (1959, p.80), ‘‘the simplest way of minimizing military 
power would appear to be the maximizing of the power of civilian groups in relation to 
the military.’’ On the other hand, the letter type of civilian control leads him argue that 
‘‘it is the distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is 
most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the 
members of the officer corps’’ (Huntington 1959, p.83). However, as real world cases 
indicate, professionalization and/or institutionalization, as Huntington defines, do not 
necessarily lead to civilian supremacy. 
Except Rebecca Schiff’s Theory of Concordance, as Feaver (1997) says the 
‘‘existing political science literature tends to treat civil-military relations as dichotomous 
variable-civilians in control/not in control- and does not explore the different causal 
effects of other forms of societal-military relations.’’ Indeed, according to James Burk 
(2002) also directs attention to the blurring lines between the military and civilian spheres 
and argues (2002, p.8)  that ‘‘ unlike Huntington, Janovitz recognized that  the 
boundaries between the military and political spheres were blurred and as a consequence 
there would be new forms of tension between military and political elites.’’ 
Huntington inaugurated this line of study with his argument that professionalism 
was the key to the civilian control, but he included in his definition of professionalism 
acceptance of the ethic of subordination, so his argument, for Feaver (1997), was in some 
sense tautological and defined away the problem. According to Feaver (1997) ‘‘the civil-
military field has been dominated by ideational and norm-based explanations for 40 years, 
and some of the best new work is instead exploring the rationalist and interest-based 
aspects of civil-military relations.’’ 
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According to Feaver (1997), along with Huntington, traditionalist theorists such 
as Janowitz (1960) and Welch (1976) all emphasize various measures aimed at the 
disposition of the military: professionalizing it and/or keeping it integrated with society, 
establishing social contracts that delineate spheres of influence, and so on. Welch (1976), 
in contrast, emphasizes efforts aimed at the military institution itself. He favors the 
boundaries, mission, values, organization, recruitment, and socialization of the military 
so as to foster ‘‘a mutual sense of political restraint on part of officers and politicians 
alike.’’ Nordlinger (1977, p.2-19) refers to interventionist officers as praetorian soldiers 
who ‘‘portray themselves as responsible and patriotic officers.’’  He (1977) invented a 
tripartite typology of praetorianism that consists of moderators, guardians, and rulers.   
According to Nordlinger’s (1977, p.25) levels of military intervention, moderators 
exercise a veto power over a varied range of governmental decisions and political 
disputes and try to preserve the status quo. However, over time, praetorian moderators 
regularly transform themselves into guardians or rulers.  Praetorian guardians on the 
other hand, ‘‘intend to correct what are seen to be the malpractices and deficiencies of the 
previous government. They are ‘iron surgeons’ ready to make some incisions into the 
body politic, but doing little to replace what has been cut out.’’ Praetorian rules however, 
do ‘‘not only control the government but dominate the regime, sometimes attempting to 
control large slices of political, economic and social life through the creation of 
mobilization structures ’’ (Nordlinger 1977, p.26). In addition to them, Boene contributed 
to the oldest debate in civil-military relations over fusionism which argues that the line 
between the military and the political has become so blurred that the distinction has lost 
its meaning (Feaver 1997). 
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Another prominent traditionalist, Samuel E. Finer lays out the tenets of his theory 
in The Man on Horseback: The Military in the Politics of Today by analyzing the 1960 
coup in Turkey as well. Finer first makes a regime distinction based on their position in 
relation to military. For him, in the first place, there is a distinct class of countries where 
governments have been repeatedly subjected to the interference of their armed forces. 
They are certainly not subordinated to the civilians. Nor are they despotisms or 
autocracies of a totalitarian type where the military are subordinated to the civilians as 
much as or even more than in the liberal-democratic regimes. These regimes of military 
provenance or military rule are sui generis. On the other hand, the military as an 
independent political force constitutes a distinct and peculiar political phenomenon. The 
regime of military provenance or direct military rule is a distinctive kind of regime; and 
the military as an independent political force is a distinctive political phenomenon (Finer 
1962).  
Finer (1962) also points out to the political strengths and weaknesses of the 
military. For him, the armed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian 
organizations: a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic 
status, and a monopoly of arms. Finer (1962) follows with the familiar question of the 
civil-military relations theory. He says that ‘‘the wonder is not why the military rebels 
against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them.’’ However, he diagnoses two 
crippling weaknesses in the armed forces. One weakness is the armed forces’ technical 
inability to administer any, but the most primitive community. The second is their lack of 
a moral title to rule. Yet in some countries –such as Turkey- the military seems 
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competent enough to administer successfully and even have the legitimacy to rule in the 
eyes of the people. 
Along with the features of the military, political culture is a determinant in 
military interventions for Finer. According to him, in countries with low political culture, 
where civilian organization is feeble however, this paradox operates in a kind of reverse 
sense. The sheer absence of civilian counter pressures encourages the military to set up a 
full-blooded military oligarchy; on the other hand, the sheer invulnerability of the 
military leaves this as a matter of choice, not of necessity. Examples of the first paradox, 
countries with relatively strong civilian organization, are provided by Argentine; by 
Turkey since 1960, by pre-war Greece, and in some degree, by the course of events in 
Egypt between 1952 and 1954 (Finer 1962, p.119). 
In an attempt to make a comparative analysis on military interventions, Morris 
Janotivz (1971, p.308) focuses on the emergence of the military in the West and the 
Middle East. Given the importance attributed to the professionalization of soldiers, 
Janovitz states that ‘‘the military professional is rooted in the historical experiences of 
European feudalism.’’ As he points out ‘‘the military operated or were created as a civil 
service type establishment of the central government without the social and personal 
connection to a landed upper-strata. Mostly in the Ottoman Empire, it was a long-
standing practice for the Sultanate to recruit and develop a distinct bureaucratic stratum 
from various social groups including the very lowest to staff the military. There was a 
strong emphasis on wide geographic dispersion of recruitment. As a result these officers 
had primary attachments to the government’’ (Janovitz, 1971). 
 7
An important point to bear in mind is mentioned by him (1972): ‘‘Feudalism as it 
was known in Western Europe was not to be found in the Ottoman Empire. Bernard 
Lewis describes the elements of feudalism that existed; and he uses the term 
‘bureaucratic feudalism’ which helps highlight the essential differences.’’ Janovitz’s 
(1972) analysis of the Middle Eastern armies particularly the nature of the military in the 
Ottoman Empire provides a basis for understanding the strong ties between the state and 
the soldiers: ‘‘Within the Ottoman Empire which became the base of modern Turkey,  
there was no feudal tradition nor did the colonial power encounter an aristocratic based 
military, when the dismembered portions of the Ottoman Empire came under Western 
rule.’’ 
The Janisseries were the epitome of this type of military as Janovitz (1972, p.313) 
reminds us.  ‘‘In the Ottoman Empire the conception of statism was central and the 
military an integral part of this ideology. Social origins and professional indoctrination 
served to perpetuate and strengthen such thinking.’’(Janovitz 1972, p. 318) 
Obviously they were not recruited in the way Western armies were formed. Janovitz 
(1972) seems right to argue that ‘‘using the Turkish case as the modal type and the case 
for which some of the best data exists, there is reason to believe that there has been a 
great deal of stability in the social recruitment from the end of the nineteenth century to 
the middle of the twentieth century. The first source for the officer corps is the sons of the 
officer corps itself. In part, this is the normal process of occupational inheritance in any 
profession which is particularly strong in the military profession.’’ He (Janovitz, 1972) 
strengthens his comparison by applying to different observations:  
The comparability with the Turkish data and with the ‘ideal typical’ 
pattern of the Middle East can be seen from Be’eri’s observation that there was 
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not a single officer from the top hundred great landowning group, nor were any 
related to the ‘few hundred families of great landowners, bankers, industrialist 
and big business. 
 
 To the contrary, even the proportion living off the rents from landed property- 
even small estates was limited; rather two thirds of families whose relatives were salaried 
employees’’(Janovitz 1972, p.314). 
However, it would be useful to bear in mind that all the land belonged to the 
sultan in the Ottoman Empire until late 19th century except his grants for achievement. 
Ergun Ozbudun’s argument about the modern Turkish army that Janovitz refers to is an 
accurate one. ‘‘The military …has always offered better avenues of advancement to the 
sons of lower and lower-middle classes. The appeal of the military profession to what is 
identified as the ‘growth elements’ of the society- modern intellectuals, technicians, the 
innovators and entrepreneurs- has never been great during the history of the Republic and 
was even less so in the 1950s’’(Janovitz 1972, p.350). 
As Janovitz (1972, p.316) points out in the Western polities ‘‘in general, the 
military does not attract men who have strong symbolic interests and skills which are part 
of the requirements of political leadership.’’ He seems to have a strong point in arguing 
that ‘‘this is less the case for the Middle East because of the traditions of the military; and 
in specific cases, men have even entered the military with political interests in mind 
because other avenues were blocked.’’ After having said all these Janovitz (1972, p.317) 
states one of the root causes of lack of professionalization and isolation in some militaries 
as follows: 
While in Western Europe the social origin factors worked to support the 
professional education and social origin factors in producing political isolation 
and a conservative commitment to the status quo, the interaction of these two 
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dimensions in the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently, in other parts of the Middle 
East, worked in the opposite direction. 
 
As a result ‘‘in the Middle East, the military is a bureaucratic group, and like 
other such groups, it is more directly involved in administrative politics. When the 
Turkish army began to accept the notion that it was above politics, it was the result of the 
efforts of a charismatic leader; it was a norm which, during the period of modernization, 
had to be developed’’ (Janovitz 1972, p.317).  
Both Huntington’s and Janovitz’s theories that are among the main theoretical 
work in civil-military relations are thought to have flaws according to Burk. He (2002) 
argues that they: 
Each treats only part of the problem that a democratic theory of civil-
military relations confronts. Huntington’s theory focuses on the matter of 
protecting democracy, but neglects the problem of sustaining democratic values 
and practice. Janovitz’s theory focuses on the matter of sustaining democratic 
values, but neglects the problem of protecting the democratic state. 
 
Having said all these it is clear that there is sort of a ‘path-dependency’ in 
military’s perception of the civilian world. The ways the militaries are formed and 
operate determine the course of relations with the civilian world. Since the militaries 
historically hold an enormous amount of power, at least the arms, it is worth to question 
the reasons to expect them to obey the civilians in the first place. As Feaver (1997) states 
‘‘any military strong enough to defend civilian society is also strong enough to destroy it. 
It is therefore essential that the military choose not to exploit its advantage, voluntarily 
submitting to civilian control.’’ 
As far as the civilian control is concerned, according to Feaver (1997) civilian 
control techniques can be grouped into two broad categories: a. those that affect the 
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ability of the military to subvert control, and b. those that affect the disposition of the 
military to be insubordinate. He follows: 
 
Societies that do not face grave external threats may choose to keep the 
regular army small in size or rely on a mobilized citizenry for defense; this was 
the preferred option of the United States until the twentieth century. Countries 
that face an external threat, or regimes that feel the need for large forces to 
preserve power, may deploy sizeable armed forces but keep them divided, 
perhaps by setting various branches against each other using secret police and 
other parallel chains of command to keep the military in check (Frazer 1994, 
Belkin 1998). In fact, the use of counter veiling institutions such as border guards, 
secret police, paramilitary forces, militias, presidential guards, and so on is one of 
the most common forms of control, used by both by autocracies (the Ottoman 
Empire). 
 
However counter divisions within a country’s military to prevent concentration of 
power in one institution might lead to cleavages. Instead efforts towards an obedient 
army, in other words military disposition, sound more fruitful. According to Feaver 
(1997), the most prominent mechanism is the principle itself, which is variously called 
the ‘cult of obedience’, the norm of civilian control or simply professionalism. In civil-
military terms this translates to a. adjusting the ascriptive characteristics of the military so 
that people inclined to obey will populate it, and adjusting the incentives of the military 
so that, regardless of their nature, the members will prefer to obey (Feaver 1997). 
Another way to assure military disposition is strengthening the legitimacy of the civilian 
government according to Holsti. 
Rebecca Schiff lays out a different theory that rules out the assumption of the 
traditional interpretations for ideal civilian-military relations. Theory of Concordance 
does not aim to have military disposition and provides a new perspective for countries 
that suffer from military’s intervention in the civilian realm.  
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According to Schiff (1995), a major conclusion of current civil-military relations 
theory is that militaries should remain physically and ideologically separated from 
political institutions. Her theory, however, sees a high level of integration between the 
military and other parts of society as one of several types of civil-military relationship. 
 Concordance theory achieves two goals: first, it explains the institutional and 
cultural conditions that affect relations among the military, the political elites, and society; 
second, it predicts that if the three partners- namely the military, the political elites, and 
the society- agree on the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to 
occur (Schiff 1995). Nevertheless, such thinking raises the following question: Why 
would the military intervene if it were already in charge? Would incorporation of the 
military in the civilian affairs live up to the democratic standards? 
Schiff (1995) seems right to say that ‘‘the current theory is derived largely from 
the experience of the United States, and assumes that American institutional separation 
should be applied to all nations to prevent domestic military intervention.’’ However she 
(Schiff 1995) argues that ‘‘concordance theory, by contrast, considers the unique 
historical and cultural experiences of nations and the various other possibilities for civil-
military relations, which maybe different from the American example.’’ Also, Schiff 
(1995) believes that ‘‘the current theory argues for the separation of civil and military 
institutions. It fails to take into account the cultural and historical conditions that may 
encourage or discourage civil-military institutional separation. Concordance moves 
beyond institutional analysis by addressing issues relevant to a nation’s culture’’ (Schiff 
1995) Ottoman Empire, indeed, is a good example of the military’s embeddedness in the 
state. 
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Among the cultural factors that Schiff (1995) emphasize are the values, attitudes, 
and symbols informing not only the nation’s view of the military, but also the military’s 
own view of that role which would be very relevant to the Turkish military. According to 
Schiff (1995)  ‘‘the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, and 
shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and society.’’ 
Unlike the traditional dichotomy ‘‘concordance does not assume that separate 
civil and military spheres are required to prevent domestic military intervention’’(Schiff 
1995) and brings a new approach, but takes the role of the soldiers in politics for granted. 
Despite this shortcoming, her theory has value for providing a new perspective since as 
Schiff (1995) states ‘‘relationship between civil and military institutions is not enough to 
explain the dynamic interactions taking place among the political, military, and social 
sectors of society.’’ 
In the Turkish case, popularity and the embedded nature of the military in society 
make one think that the Theory of Concordance has more explanatory power in Turkey. 
Turkish military constantly directs attention to the unique conditions of the country that 
makes Turkey vulnerable and look for exception in complying with democratic standards. 
In August 2005, while talking about the relationship between the Turkish military and 
Turkey’s civilian authorities, Hilmi Ozkok, Chief of the General Staff of the Military 
revealed the same mentality that gives an idea about the military’s view:  ‘‘[it may be an] 
exception to the standardized civil-military relationship, but every country has different 
needs, conditions, values, histories, societal concerns, and dynamics ’’ (Aydinli et 
al.2006). 
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 Having summarized the main pillars of the civilian-military relations literature it 
is now relatively easier to get started with the Turkish case. 
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 II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY
 
It is not a secret that Turkish democracy has not yet met the ideal standards of a 
consolidated democracy. In other words, democracy is not always ‘the only game in 
town’ in Adam Przeworksi’s terms. The rule of law and accountability are often 
undermined and the military’s role in politics is almost taken for granted. Since the 
transition to the multi-party system in 1946, Turkish political system has been generating 
a mixed performance. Even after relatively stable and democratic periods of governance, 
political fragmentation, polarization, and deadlocks are likely to appear and result in the 
restlessness of the military and the ‘reluctant’ interventions of the Turkish General Staff 
(TGS). 
It is hard to disagree with Dunkwart Rustow (1979) in his observation that 
‘‘Turkey’s situation is complex and in some respects paradoxical.’’ It seems that the 
reasoning behind his conviction is the clash between the introduction of democracy in 
late 1940s and the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a minor but persistent theme 
as Rustow (1979) observes. However this theme is not minor since early 1990s and 
occupies the agenda of the military and sets an obstacle in front of full civilian control of 
politics. Indeed, the big question of this thesis involves the very same issue: Securing the 
Republic at the expense of democracy. 
Turkish democracy’s mixed performance and hybrid nature deserve to be 
analyzed thoroughly. For Tim Jacoby (2003), after the World War II, there was the ‘‘the 
formation of a hybrid regime combining different elements of autocratic militarism and 
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semi-authoritarian incorporation.’’ Similarly, Ahmet Insel (2004, p.45) argues that ‘‘it is 
possible to define the hybrid nature of the regime as praetorian republic. In such a 
structure, the privileges and the rights are not personal, but tied to class.’’ 
In terms of democratic consolidation Turkey, still needs to pass a high threshold 
that is formed by the strong influence-if not the hegemony- of the military. The minute 
Turkey removes the giant shadow of the soldiers from politics, the chances to become a 
full-fledged democracy will increase dramatically. Given the fluctuations in the degree of 
democracy and the high costs paid by the civilians in the past, it seems that we do not and 
will not witness a linear and always positive progress.  
It is not only the perception of the soldiers, but also the ‘civilian’ approach 
towards the military that causes democratic breakdowns. Even as of 2006, the Turkish 
public opinion takes the role of the military in politics for granted. As Nilufer Narli (2000) 
points out ‘‘a majority of Turks accept the military as guardian of democracy, secularism, 
and national unity and approve of the military’s involvement in politics. One explanatory 
factor for the army’s rising prominence throughout the 1990s is the decline in support for 
Turkey’s center-oriented parties since the late 1980s.’’ In a supportive argument, Jung 
and Piccoli (2001, p.100) portray the central dilemma of Turkish politics:  ‘‘The negative 
image of Turkish political parties and the positive reputation of the Turkish armed forces 
are two sides of the same coin.’’ 
 It is only usual to read debates over the possible consequences of the new military 
appointees, their stance towards soldier’s involvement in politics or statements of a high-
ranking general about a social phenomenon, a political issue, or even a person in the 
leading newspapers of the country, regardless of the relevance of the generals’ area of a 
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responsibility. Obviously, in a proper democracy people are not expected to pay attention 
to the appointments within the army since the duty of the military and the procedures are 
designated by the system.  
In Turkey, progress in democratization bogs down because of the power struggle 
between the military and the civilians. As Tanel Demirel (2004) also states ‘‘civil-
military interaction, which is a power relation on top of everything involves tension and 
conflict like all other power relations.’’ In this power struggle, so far the TGS seems to 
have the upper hand.  As Demirel (2004)  argues ‘‘the TGS has gone a long way in 
making its extraordinary role acceptable to other societal actors. The TGS is perceived as 
an institutionalized, trustworthy, and desirable institution.’’ Although a combination of 
factors -that will be analyzed throughout this chapter- led to the privileged position of the 
TGS, as Umit Cizre (2004) accurately discovers ‘‘the real secret of the rising political 
autonomy of the TGS does not stem from its control-centered strategy, but focusing on 
the project to ‘create a citizen consents to hegemony’ (italics are mine) with the help of 
the media and civil-society’’ and unfortunately the project was successful especially 
during the February 28 era. It seems true that ‘the limitations to the freedom of the press 
have contributed to a culture of self-censorship, according to which sensitive topics such 
as religious liberties, the cult of Ataturk, the Armenian massacres, Kurdish identity and 
the role of the military have been deliberately avoided for many years’’ (Jung 2001). 
In Turkiye’de Ordu that collects various studies on the Turkish military, editors 
Ali Bayramoglu, Ahmet Insel and Omer Laciner (2004) direct attention to the lack of 
transparency in the TGS- which is in adverse with the institution’s prestige- and believe 
that it is not a coincidence. For them, ‘‘the TGS is an institution that talks more compared 
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to the militaries in the other countries, but is disturbed about having talked about itself at 
the same time …What is really  demanded most by the society in Turkey’s authoritarian 
democracy is either to be silent about the TGS or only praise it’’ (Bayramoglu et al. 
2004). Consequently, the majority of the people tacitly approve the military interventions 
when the conditions ‘require’ them just like the way the TGS want them to do which 
reinforces the following argument: ‘‘ the military and the bureaucracy view a democratic 
society not as pluralistic, but as a unitary community based on a legal authority’’(Jung 
2001). What makes their support unconditional for the army is their gradual loss of the 
‘center’ and the privileges that came along coupled with ideological bigotry. However 
there is a smaller, but stauncher advocate of the military’s intervention in politics in 
Turkey regardless of the state of the country.  
In Ersin Kalaycioglu’s (2001) words, ‘‘the majority that made up the Periphery 
was forced to live under the law, while those connected to the classical Center of RPP 
(Republican People’s Party) elite could often receive exceptional and favorable treatment 
by the political authorities in the one party era.’’ Tanel Demirel (2004) voices similar and 
accurate arguments: 
Small but influential elite groups which believe that secularism and gains 
by Kemalism were more important than the democratic regime and regard the 
advent of democracy as nothing more than the age of concessions from the golden 
age of single party years, had been re-invigorated as the threat of political Islam 
loomed large. One comes across statements that a coup d’etat is acceptable if the 
‘gains’ of the Republic are threatened. 
 
Apparently, the first privileged class of the Republic, which is composed of 
bureaucrats and soldiers, were in the ‘center’ and some considered the 1950 elections as a 
‘counter-revolution.’ The authoritarian elements of the one party era did not disturb them 
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because they enjoyed being the dominant force in the society without any involvement of 
the ‘periphery.’ 
It would not be unfair to argue that what we witness in Turkey is almost the 
tyranny of the minority under the government of majority. As Jung and Piccoli (2001) 
state ‘‘Turkish army is the key institution that holds up the authoritarian, state-centered 
and paternalistic spirit of the Turkish modernization process.’’ Hence letting the state 
become technocratic and completely democratic means the loss of both psychological 
and material supremacy of the military. However, the military has and will always let the 
civilians lead daily business of the country and manage areas which have secondary 
significance as long as the ‘interests of the nation’- as they see fit for sure- are not 
threatened. As Ali Bayramoglu (2004, p.117) argues ‘‘In the Turkish state structure the 
main reference point is the TGS. It is the right of the TGS, its members and the National 
Security Council (NSC) to take initiative which makes political institutions only sources 
of legitimacy and ratification points.’’ In such a structure, ‘‘no political group could 
eliminate the TGS’ ability to intervene in politics by redefining the dominant ideology on 
the grounds to protect the existence of the state’’ (Cizre 2004). Indeed, the civilians 
should be able to debate and redefine the taboos of the official ideology to win 
supremacy over the soldiers.  
Given the problematic of Turkish democracy, the following question becomes 
relevant as Bayramoglu (2004, p.118)  raises: Is it because the civilians are passive that 
the soldiers are embedded in the political system or vice versa? He believes that the 
answer is given in a military publication: ‘‘Legitimacy is an abstract concept. Elections 
do not always reflect legitimacy.’’ Although the statement is self-explanatory, it affirms 
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the mistrust of soldiers in civilians. It also proves Demirel’s  (2004) brilliant analysis on 
the distinction in Turkish politics between spheres of ‘government’ and spheres of the 
‘state’ who says that ‘‘the first refers to the daily business of governing, particularly the 
economy and the distribution of resources, and is the responsibility of the elected 
government. The second refers to long-term (and allegedly higher) interests of the state; 
particularly internal and external security issues and is the responsibility of the civil-
military bureaucracy, or the state.’’ 
 
A. History of the Military’s Role in Turkish Politics 
The idea of ‘army nation’ is taught at schools in Turkey from the early ages on. 
The military has always been the founder of Turkish states. Sixteen months of military 
service for males over the age of twenty is still obligatory and many Turks perceive it as 
a part of manhood, maturation as well as an honorable citizenship duty. Also, in almost 
all public opinion polls military is the most trusted institution by the nation. Currently, 
Turkish military is the second largest in NATO after the US. All these sociological and 
historical factors prepare a conceivable basis for a politically influential military. 
As Metin Heper and Aylin Guney (1996) state ‘‘during the nineteenth century, the 
military had been both the object and subject of modernization. Initially the aim was to 
create a military that was trained, disciplined, and obedient to central authority. The 
military as the initiator of modernization is accepted unanimously. Rustow wrote that 
‘‘the political modernization of Turkey occurred for the most part under military aegis. 
For nearly hundred years, the soldier has been Turkey’s foremost modernizer’’ ( cited in 
Tachau&Heper, 1993). 
 20
As a result it is not surprising to witness military’s predominance in public life as 
a long and strong tradition in Turkey as Lerner and Robinson (1960) suggest. For them 
(1960) ‘‘the Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else. In fact, 
the government and army were one and these themes are still resonant when one 
considers the founding of the Turkish Republic.’’ Ataturk himself was a soldier, but as 
Gareth Jenkins (2001) points out ‘‘he moved quickly to differentiate between soldiers and 
politicians in the belief that active involvement in politics would corrupt the military as 
an institution.’’ 
It is essential to understand how the military in Turkey perceives itself. As 
Jenkins  (2001) states ‘‘the Turkish military sees itself as the guardian of the Turkish 
state with a moral and legal obligation to protect ‘the Turkish Republic’ against every 
kind of threat or danger which might threaten the existence of the state.’’ The military 
thinks that the Kemalist state is entrusted to the soldiers and they should be ready to 
protect especially the ‘secular’ nature of the Republic against internal and external threats. 
According to Omer Laciner (2004, p.21), however, ‘‘Ataturk reforms are nothing, but the 
ideological means for the military-bureaucratic class to place itself as the indispensable 
sovereign element of the new society order.’’ Such a mindset places a strong barrier in 
front of complete civilian governance.  It seems true that ‘‘although the TGS thinks that it 
has the right to comment on every issue in the society and constantly raise its voice, the 
opposite is not thinkable’’ (Insel&Bayramoglu, p.9). Clearly, as Aydinli, Ozcan and 
Akyaz (2006) state, for the Turkish public, the military is inseparable from the idea of the 
nation. They argue that ‘‘the military shares the public’s perception of its role, seeking 
itself as the guardian if Turkey’s stability.’’ Although the former argument has a strong 
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validity, it would be inaccurate to claim that the nation appointed the military as the 
guardian rather than the other way around. 
The roots of the guardianship role date back to late Ottoman times although the 
military is primarily concerned about the protection of the secular Republic, which was 
established in 1923. Soldiers enjoyed such a privileged place in the Ottoman Empire that 
Rustow (Demirel 2004) depicted the Ottoman State as a ‘military camp and educational 
institution.’’ Modernization movements in the Ottoman Empire in early 19th century 
started in the military. Since the currency of power was military might during the 
glorious times of the Empire, the ruling class thought that they could restore the state by 
modernizing the military first and foremost. Although the involvement of soldiers in 
politics would be expected in a collapsing empire, Ataturk was careful to exclude politics 
from the army to protect the unity of the Armed Forces. His decision was a sound one, 
but Maniruzzaman does not seem to reach accurate conclusions on Ataturk’s decision. 
Maniruzzaman claims that Ataturk purposely neglected the development of the Turkish 
armed forces. The scholar argues that ‘‘this was partly because of Kemal’s belief that 
officers’ involvement in politics would harm the nation’s politics as well as its armed 
forces. Kemal also feared that officers’ involvement in politics might lead to military 
coup by other popular generals’’(Maniruzzaman 1992). However the evidence does not 
support such an argument. The military has been one of the most developed institutions 
of Turkey and until Turgut Ozal, the country did not have a civilian president, but 
generals. 
Theoretically it is assumed that increased professionalism in the military brings 
about withdrawal from politics which did not happen in the Turkish case. As Narli (2004, 
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cited in Bayramoglu et al.) points out ‘‘the increased professionalism of the army is 
associated with greater military influence in the Turkish case rather than increased 
subordination of the military to the civilian authority.’’ 
 
B. The Self-Ascribed Duty of TGS: Guardianship of the Regime 
 
The civil- military relations in Turkey cannot be comprehended without analyzing 
the reasons and results of the military’s guardianship role. Consequently, the students of 
Turkish politics have repeatedly expressed the ‘guardianship of the military’, which is 
almost a self- ascribed duty by the soldiers themselves. The military perceives itself as 
the ultimate protector of the secular regime from both external and internal threats. 
Indeed, the National Security Course that is required at secondary level education is a 
good example of military’s mentality. As Gul Altinay (2004) states ‘‘the general message 
that is given in the curriculum is that politics is a military matter and it should be 
conducted from a military point of view.’’ It is true that this course is the only one that 
politics is discussed at the high schools (Insel&Bayramoglu 2004, p.11). 
In accordance with this perception and self appointed duty, the military did not 
hesitate to intervene starting from 1960s when the periphery began to have a say in the 
decision making process. In Rustow’s (1979) words in 1950s ‘‘democracy has also 
spread to the rural and urban masses what used to be the privileged possession of small 
educated elite.’’ Indeed, Ahmet Insel (2004)  considers the TGS to be a social class and 
summarizes the reasons behind civilian subordination as follows:  
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Since 1960 military intervention, the civilian powers and the bureaucracy 
are subordinate to the autonomous power of the TGS. The main reason for this is 
the military interventions in the last fifty years. The second reason for the 
subordination to the TGS is that the official ideology still takes advantage of the 
War of Liberation which naturalizes the dominant position of the TGS. The third 
factor is the patriarchal societal norms that are compatible with the position of the 
TGS. 
 
Despite the military’s interruptions since 1960, Jenkins (2001) seems right that 
the military ‘‘prefers to exert influence within the governmental and constitutional 
framework rather than trying to bring down and replace the government from outside, 
what it terms as ‘fine tuning’ the system rather demolishing and rebuilding it.’’ He (2001) 
argues that civilian authority is primary, but not supreme. Military achieves supremacy, 
as Bayramoglu (Bayramoglu et al. 2004) argues, by differentiating the state rule and 
government. According to him ‘‘this differentiation has been producing an order that 
rules out the social demand- political decision relationship, suffocates the existence of the 
political parties, narrows the political space down and gains power from the presence of 
soldiers that represent the state rule.’’ 
There are scholars who have milder reservations on the TGS however. For 
example Gareth Jenkins (2001) argues that ‘‘the military rarely dictates policy to the 
civilian government; and then usually only as a last resort when it believes that the 
situation has become critical.’’ It is clear that the frequency of the intervention or the 
reluctance of the soldiers does not make a difference as far as the quality of the 
democracy is concerned. Indeed such arguments fall short of a consolidated democracy. 
Acceptance of such an assumption would make any democracy conditional and leave it to 
the mercy of non-democratic groups that are able to determine the course of events. 
Jenkins (2001)  supposes that ‘‘the military will try to galvanize public opinion to apply 
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pressure to the government, issuing expressions of concern either in public speeches or in 
carefully prepared on- or off-the record briefings to selected journalists.’’ However, even 
such indirect exercises of power are not part of the picture in a full-fledged democracy. 
For instance, nobody expected the generals to intervene in the US when there was a 
deadlock after the Presidential elections of 2000. The trust in the system and the judiciary 
in particular prevented crisis as expected in any consolidated democracy. 
Similar to Jenkins, Karakartal (1985) argues the large Turkish army has always 
been subordinated to the civil power. For him (1985) ‘‘ this army established two 
constitutional monarchies, fought a war of national independence, created the modern 
secular Turkish state, presided over the transition to pluralist democracy and politics in 
normal times is in the domain of civilian politicians.’’ However it is problematic for 
soldiers to differentiate normal and abnormal times.  
Despite the military’s strong conviction about their role in terms of securing the 
Republic they are not obsessed about ‘direct rule.’ Rather, after each military coup the 
military sought to restore elections and multi-party system of course at their own pace 
and terms. During the breaks, interim governments that were composed of non-partisan 
technocrats were in charge until the nation was ready to return to civilian rule. As 
Kalaycioglu (2001) states ‘‘military regimes never tried to justify their prolonged rule as 
an alternative to democratic government. Periods of military rule were exceptions rather 
than the rule and never challenged the merits of democratic government.’’ It is almost as 
if there is a ‘big brother’ of Turkish democracy who keeps an eye on and warns it at times 
of disconformities. As Kalaycioglu (2001) acknowledges as well ‘‘despite Turkey’s long 
record of democracy, its system has failed to provide the expected continuity and 
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stability.’’ It seems that as long as the Turkish General Staff (TGS) acts like the over 
protective mother of a young boy as far as the Turkish democracy is concerned; it will 
never have the attempt or confidence to mature on his own. 
At this point it is essential to elaborate more on the attitude of Turkish military 
since it did not build a bureaucratic authoritarian regime in O’Donnell’s terms, except the 
1980-1983 period which was characterized by strong emphasis on order. As Tanel 
Demirel (2004) points out ‘‘even when they acted in authoritarian manner, they stressed 
that it was to be temporary and they resorted to it only to eliminate obstacles on the way 
towards modern civilization. The dominant tendency within the army was not to flirt with 
the idea of long term military dictatorship but instead to return to barracks with relative 
ease.’’ While such arguments sound valid, it is not only the military’s intention, but also 
the confidence that civilians always step back in case of a reaction that makes the military 
seem moderate compared to others. After all despite the increasing voice of civil society, 
as Sefa Simsek (2004) points out, ‘‘the civil society’s qualitative impact on political life 
is relatively trivial.’’ Like all the other sound analyses he also suggests that ‘‘Turkey’s 
official ideology should be more flexible, the control of politics by the military should be 
minimized, and the education system should be reformed substantially in order to 
increase the contributions of civil society to democratization’’(Simsek 2004). There is no 
doubt that Turkey needs more political liberalization in the sense that O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986) define: ‘‘By liberalization we mean the process of making effective 
certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts 
committed by the state or third parties.’’  
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C. The Most Influential Tools of the TGS: Autonomy and Lack of Accountability 
 
There is a consensus in the literature of Turkish politics on the autonomous 
position of the TGS. It is true that ‘‘Turkish Armed Forces established themselves in 
Turkey’s polity as an autonomous political force whose political role is not subject to the 
imponderables of electoral processes’’ (Jung 2001). Unlike the democratic polities where 
rules are pre-determined, in Turkey, as Bayramoglu  (Bayramoglu et al. 2004, p.117) 
states ‘‘While the government is accountable to the TGNA, the minister to the prime 
minister, and the TGNA to the people, military institutions are not accountable despite 
their extreme political rights.’’ As Narli (2004) also observes, for the TGS, ‘‘Its (TGS’) 
privileged position has guaranteed it a generous budget earmarked for reforms, 
modernization and technological advancement.’’ Such statements only affirm the 
argument that ‘‘the striking autonomy that the Turkish military has developed in the 
political, economic, and educational realms makes it virtually a state within the 
state’’(Jung 2001). 
Expectedly, such a wide autonomy that the military enjoys remains as the biggest 
obstacle for total civilian supremacy. As Umit Cizre (1997) points out ‘‘the military’s 
institutional raison d’etre is to preserve its integrity, unity, and modernity.’’ For her (1997) 
this goal can be subsumed under the rubric of political autonomy which she defines as 
‘‘the military’s ability to go above and beyond the constitutional authority of 
democratically elected governments, can include not only direct but also indirect 
influences on the government.’’ The most visible example of the military’s autonomy is 
the lack of accountability for the defense budget: In Turkey ‘‘the defense budget has 
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never been subjected to parliamentary debate. It has not been discussed in the press. It 
has never been criticized’’(Cizre 1997). Cizre (1997) seems right to claim that ‘‘the 
privileged position of the military forms the core of the Turkish military’s political 
prerogatives’’ and in the 1990s civilian politicians were unable to control the military. 
Indeed for Bayramoglu, Insel, and Laciner (2004, p.10), the secrecy over the military 
spending in Turkey does not serve the military purposes, but rather the TGS as a class. 
In countries where the military has a privileged status, material gains and benefits 
become a determining part of the equation. The military reinforces its position by means 
of constitutional protections, immunities, and bureaucratic supremacy. However 
according to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) ‘‘these are not likely to have much impact 
upon the deeply rooted self-images and attitudes of the officer corps.’’ Such privileges 
bring about material issues and they become an integral part of the power structure. 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986)direct attention to this crucial point: ‘‘There is also the 
issue of the armed forces’ role in running state and Para state enterprises, a role that has 
been quite extensive in several of our cases (Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Turkey).’’ 
Being aware of the economic interests involved in the discussion, Tanel Demirel also 
focuses on the increasing economic power of the military in Turkey. For him (Demirel 
2004): 
From the 1960s and increasingly after each coup, the military managed to 
carve out for itself legal and institutional privileges. It also came to control 
independent economic resources. The initial idea was to ensure that no 
government could deprive the military of the vital resources it needs to perform 
its sacred duty. As well as minimizing civilian influence in the internal 
organization of the military, it established an independent holding company 
(OYAK or Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund), and a proliferation of 
shopping centers, recreational facilities, officers’ clubs and special residences. 
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According to Taha Parla (2004), ‘‘OYAK (Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund) 
is a new dynamic in Turkish politics that would increase the tendency of the military to 
intervene in the political development of the country.’’ By the same token, Umit Cizre 
(1997) points out that ‘‘the privileged position of the military forms the core of the 
Turkish military’s political prerogatives.’’ The autonomy of the TGS is not limited to 
defense expenditures. As will be analyzed further, ‘‘the TGS could have more 
institutional autonomy in foreign affairs than domestic politics and perceive itself as a 
superior authority in the conflictual  issues like Cyprus, Aegean conflicts, Northern Iraq, 
relations with Israel’’(Bayramoglu&Insel 2004). With such a wide autonomy it is 
unlikely for the military to sublime to the civilian control or feel accountable for any of 
its actions.  
 
D. Problems with the TGS’s Concept of Guardianship 
 
What is problematic with the guardianship role is that the military sincerely 
believes that it knows the ‘best interests of the nation.’ However as O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986)  point out in their study of transitions this disease is not unique to 
Turkey: 
 
What is even more fundamentally at stake in this issue is the change of the 
armed forces’ messianic self-image as the institution ultimately interpreting and 
ensuring the highest interests of the nation. Such a conception, frequently linked 
to ideologies of ‘national security’ implies that the armed forces should have an 
indisputable monopoly on determining what those interests are, and when and 
how they are being menaced. 
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It is essential to understand the process that led to the ultimate domination of the 
military. As Demirel (2004) states they succeeded by segregating soldiers who tended to 
form a close-knit community from the civilian world and thus reinforcing the 
guardianship mentality. 
It is an accurate observation   that ‘‘the military is sensitive to threats directed at 
Kemalism, since that ideological framework is their source of legitimacy. In other words, 
the system of values inculcated by the armed forces is deemed to be inseparable from 
Ataturk’s conception of the secular state. When those ideals have been threatened, a 
public order threatens the stability of the Kemalist republic; senior military officers have 
felt it necessary to intervene’’(Demirel 2004). There is a consensus that in all 
interventions the military acted to ‘protect’, ‘save’ or ‘cure’ the regime. However this is 
almost like a self appointed assignment. In no consolidated democracy military holds 
itself responsible for fixing the problems of the system. Military’s only and foremost duty 
should be providing military and territorial security. Turkey seems to suffer from a 
problem Huntington (cited in Albright, 1980) describes as follows: ‘‘The problem with 
the modern state is the relation of the expert to the politician- that is ‘the cleavage’ 
produces ‘tensions’ between the two spheres.’’ 
The military’s perception of democracy does not necessarily coincide with the 
liberal systems in the Western sense. Heper and Guney touch upon the military’s 
understanding of democracy, which could indeed be highly subjective. They (1986)say 
that ‘‘officers concluded that an important component of Westernization was democracy. 
However, they favored ‘rational democracy’, that is, taking democracy as an intelligent 
debate among the educated for the purpose of deciding upon the best policy option.’’ A 
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similar assessment of Turkish military is made by Kemrava who says that ‘‘Turkish 
military has a self ascribed mission of protecting the Republic and it is reinforced when 
the elected civilians to divert from military’s conception of ‘rational democracy.’  For 
Kemrava (2000) the Turkish military turned into what Perlmutter calls an ‘arbitrator 
army.’’ 
The military, which acted as, the modernizer initially in a praetorian society 
turned out to be an obstacle in front of further political liberalization in Turkey. 
Especially in 1990s the conflict between the establishment, which wants to keep its 
privileges and the newly emerging Muslim bourgeoisie, became evident and the military 
evidently was on the formers side. As Umit Cizre (2002) points out: 
A political class threatened by the formal and informal role of the military 
as the ultimate guardian of the regime has critical problems in relinquishing 
patronage resources. In that guardianship model, the political class constantly 
weighs the political pay-off derived from a reform in the system- to put an end to 
the powerlessness, incapacity, corruption and stasis- against the costs of giving up 
power based on patronage. It is more than likely that the civilian political class 
will not choose to terminate rent- seeking networks by reforms that would reduce 
the prominence of the military in politics. Its foremost concern will be a short 
rather than a long term one. 
. 
It is true that -as Cizre argues (2004)- after the announcement of Islamic activism 
and Kurdish nationalism as the new security threats ‘‘the TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) 
has expanded the scope of its guardianship mission by securitizing the country’s serious, 
but essentially political problems, and as a result, has distanced itself even further from 
its vanguard mandate.’’ As long as the internal threats are intact, the military tends to 
have political immunity in the public eye and interventions are justified. There is a strong 
basis for Cizre’s (2004) argument that military’s enlarged guardianship by means of 
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internal security problems might stem from the extant civil-military imbalance. Given the 
unequal distribution of power Cizre (2004)  seems right to argue that: 
 
The TAF is careful not to give any signs of relinquishing its guardianship 
role, even after the 1999 Helsinki Summit’s decision to announce Turkey’s 
candidacy for the EU. Through the National Security Council (NSC), the military 
continues to have an important influence in many areas of public life…Given that 
Turkey’s NSC is not just a body for established for defense and security issues, 
but also for the preservation of the official ideology, the strictly institutional 
diagnosis of the problem and the remedy suggested is insufficient. 
 
E. The Role of the Political Culture in the Military’s Supremacy 
 
Turkey’s poor and mixed record in ultimate transition to democracy would 
require an analysis of its political culture especially in terms of the general attitude 
towards the military’s role. Although Kalaycioglu (2001) argues that ‘‘not only does 
protest potential exist in the Turkish political culture, but it also tends to take the form of 
contestation, or outright negation of authority’’ It seems that almost the opposite is valid 
given the widespread conformity of Turkish society to authority and uniform in particular. 
Indeed, Kalaycioglu’s (2001) following statement supports the argument on the apolitical 
nature of Turkish people:  
 ‘‘Certain restrictions on political action are imposed through the opportunity structure 
(constitutions, laws and regulations), which discourage citizens from being involved in 
politics.’’ However it would be unfair to Turkey to underestimate the progress in the 
level of political liberalization and the increase in pluralism in the recent decades. Yet as 
Kalaycioglu (2001) out ‘‘the political regime of the country, and most specifically its 
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constitution stands out as the impediment for the consolidation of a more pluralist 
context.’’ 
 Even today, on the brink of negotiations for the EU, the ruling party, which has 
the majority in the parliament, quickly draws back its suggestions on ‘sensitive subjects’ 
with the fear of possible reaction from the military. It is not fair to blame solely them 
although O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) tend to held civilians responsible. For the 
authors ‘‘the political tradition of such countries has been plagued (and continues to be 
plagued by) civilian politicians who refuse to accept the uncertainties of the democratic 
process and recurrently appeal to the armed forces for ‘solutions’, disguising their 
personal or group interests.’’ It is true that such groups exist in Turkey as well.  
Sometimes even before the military itself, some pundits in the media react almost 
on behalf of the military and prevent any discussion on the role of the military by means 
of provocative news and comments. There is a point in the argument that ‘‘it is the 
civilians who are confused about the extent of discussion that should take place on the 
military issues and its role in politics’’ (Koru 2005). However even the military’s shadow 
will be sufficient to intimidate the governments as long as there are ardent supporters of 
the military among the relatively educated and civilized segments of the society. After an 
EU official’s remarks on Ataturk, Guneri Civaoglu (2005), a well-known columnist of 
Milliyet, wrote that ‘‘if politicians do not raise their voices to respond to the criticism 
from the EU on Ataturk, the military should talk, even if the soldiers are not supposed to 
talk about politics’’ and praised Yasar Buyukanit, the Chief of the Land Forces, for his 
comments on defense of Ataturk.   It is only expected to have reservations about the 
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progress of democracy in Turkey when a columnist -who by nature is supposed to be 
progressive-, takes refuge in the military. 
Although the military is primarily responsible for preventing further and full 
democratization by keeping its weight on politics, the perception in society that sees the 
engagement of soldiers in politics normal encourages them. As Kalaycioglu (2001) points 
out ‘‘opportunity to influence, or exchange of votes for services and benefits from the 
state budget, make the game of democratic politics attractive to the masses.’’ It would not 
be inaccurate to claim that not all civilians are uncomfortable with the violations of 
human rights or lack of liberalization unless they are affected at a very personal level. 
Kalaycioglu (2001) seems right to claim that democracy is maintained at the expense of 
the rule of law. Unfortunately the expectations of the Turkish public reinforce the general 
picture.  According to a global survey conducted by BBC and Gallup, the respondents 
were asked which segment of the society they would prefer to grant more prerogatives 
and in Turkey 40% of the people said the military and the police while the average global 
response was the intellectuals with 35%. Based on this outcome, columnist Gulay 
Gokturk (2005) duly argues that ‘‘the Turkish nation, would like to control the politicians 
by increasing the power of the military.’’ In Turkey, as she claims, ‘‘we defend transition 
to civilian life not only against the military, but also 40% of the nation’’(Gokturk 2005).  
A supportive argument is made by Aydinli, Ozcan and Akyaz (2006): ‘‘The brief military 
coups of 1970 and 1980 only confirmed the public’s impression that the military seizes 
civilian power to project it.’’ Although it is ironic enough that the military protects 
democracy from civilians, even more ironic is that despite the tacit approval of the 
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interventions, no political party endorsed by the TGS after the coups gained popularity or 
came to power. 
Equally ironically, in addition to the nation’s mistrust in the civilians, but 
confidence in the military, the problems with democratization also stem from the army’s 
lack of confidence in the nation. However the military does not completely rule out the 
merit of civilian government. As Demirel (2004) states that ‘‘although they have some 
deep reservations in respect of civil control, it would be unfair to suggest that they favor 
long-term military rule or pseudo democracy.’’ He (2004) says that ‘‘the military worry 
that a full fledged democratic regime might jeopardize the existence of the secular and 
unitary Turkish Republic.’’ Although Demirel’s analysis is correct and the military has 
sincere concerns, it is hard to grasp such a conditional understanding of democracy. Such 
an argument means that only a certain group of people is eligible for governing as long as 
they do not bother the military and their understanding of democracy.  
Similarly, a prominent scholar of Turkish politics, Heper (2003) points out that 
‘‘in Turkey, the military accepts the fact that final authority constitutionally belongs to 
the civilian government, but on the other hand, it intervenes in politics if, in its opinion 
the country faces the threat of political Islam as well as separatist nationalism.’’ What 
makes this game work in Turkey is that, as Demirel (2004) successfully diagnoses, 
‘‘civilian leadership has been hesitant, if not extremely timid, in questioning the 
prevailing power configuration.’’ Unfortunately civilians have always been the 
compromising party in fear of further chaos and certain groups even encouraged more 
involvement of the army in politics. Indeed as Gulay Gokturk (2005) suggests we have to 
look at the debates around the promotions and appointments in the army and how much 
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place they occupy in the agenda to understand the weight of the military in Turkish 
politics. After the rumors on the possible extension of Chief of the TGS Hilmi Ozkok’s 
term in order to push harder liner Yasar Buyukanit to retirement in November 2005, 
Gokturk (2005) rightfully wrote that people has taken this role of the army for granted 
and this acceptance reinforces and legitimizes the de facto situation that needs to be 
changed. Names and timing may be different, but such debates only serve to reinforce the 
military’s supreme position over the elected.  It is true that ‘‘in a proper democracy it 
does not matter much who the next chief of general staff or the other armies would be 
because no matter who is in charge, soldiers mind their own business under the command 
of the civilian authority’’(Gokturk 2005). 
Unfortunately such a submission even by the politicians seems to prove Demirel’s 
(2004) argument that civilians believe that democracy is possible only to the extent that 
the military approves. The secure place of the Armed Forces among the most trusted 
institutions in the public opinion surveys shows that the military still has the power to act 
like an overprotective parent of an immature child. It is true that ‘‘civilians are 
apprehensive of the military and therefore do not commit to policies that are likely to 
instigate military reaction. Civilians might be quite content with the existing state of 
affairs’’(Demirel 2004). This does not necessarily mean that the new urban middle class 
approves the military’s intervention, but they prefer to remain silent and stay away from 
tension. It is the members of the establishment who try to keep their prominence in the 
center and applauds the military’s involvement in politics whenever a threat becomes 
visible according to their evaluation. 
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The reason why the military is the most trusted institution most of the time is 
probably the reaction to the corrupt politicians who are concerned about patronage and 
nepotism along with the ages old respect for the army. As Demirel (2004) states ‘‘it is 
difficult to ensure civilian control if the military carries the burden of a fight against a 
separatist resurrection, or if there is a large gap at the level of trust in the citizens’ display 
towards the politicians and the military.’’ However, fed up with the decade’s long 
instability and wide range corruption the public did not let the existing main parties enter 
the parliament in the 2002 elections. Instead, and to a certain extent surprisingly, the 
newly founded Justice and Development Party (JDP) gained the majority. The second 
runner was the RPP, party of the center left and the state elite, however following behind 
the JDP with a wide margin. In a recent article in the Economist the RPP was accused of 
remaining oblivious to the changes in Turkish society. According to the analysis ‘‘as 
religiously conservative Anatolians migrated to the cities, the handful of pro-secular 
ideologues running the RPP condemned them to political irrelevance.’’ 
The JDP on the other hand emerged as the representatives of the periphery led by 
the former mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A protégé of Erbakan, Erdogan 
was sentenced to prison due to a poem he read in a public address. The poem allegedly 
encouraged the people to ‘hatred and animosity’ toward each other. Indeed the 
imprisonment made Erdogan a bigger political figure and after his short stay in prison he 
emerged as the leader of the JDP, which was composed mostly of the moderate members 
of Erbakan tradition. In reaction to doubts over the JDP’s sincerity on the secular 
principles of the Republic, the leading members of the party kept renewing their loyalty 
to the Kemalist secular state. However the often-overt mistrust toward the governing 
 37
party has never been disappeared despite the JDP’s unprecedented efforts in the EU 
membership process. Indeed as Gareth Jenkins (2004) states ‘‘so long as the Kemalist 
establishment continues to restrict the JDP’s maneuver, it will be difficult to know 
whether the governing party’s avowed enthusiasm for democracy and EU accession is 
genuine.’’ 
On the other hand such a commitment of the military to be involved in politics 
when ‘necessary’ makes civilians insecure about changing the status quo. Turkish society 
at large simply cannot feel sufficiently confident to challenge the military’s privileged 
place contains a significant element of truth (Jenkins 2004). Although the military coups 
were not completely considered legitimate in the eyes of the public and even by the 
military, the military has always been on top among the most trusted institutions. This 
contradiction seems like a good evidence to display how hybrid the Turkish political 
culture is. 
It seems that Turkish military’s perceptions of threats to the secular and unitary 
state are mostly illusions and this keeps them from adopting a universally accepted idea 
of a democratic regime. For instance the military often perpetuates its commitment to 
democracy, but as Jenkins (2004) states ‘‘the military’s conception of democracy is 
shaped by what it sees as specific conditions in and threats to Turkey and is based on its 
own perception of the expression of the national will rather than just ballot- box results.’’ 
Obviously the idea that Turkey is unique in terms of security threats and has ‘special 
conditions’ makes all kinds of restrictions on democracy legitimate at least on the part of 
the military. One recent example took place on December 8, 2005. A member of the 
ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) and the TGNA, Resul Tosun, wrote in a 
 38
column that the capital Ankara does not look civilian enough and suggested the TGS to 
replace its national guard in the TGNA with a civilian one.1  Before even allowing the 
public debate his suggestion, the military issued an official declaration and called such 
attempts  ‘individual delirium.’2 Needless to say, such seemingly harmless interventions 
prevent democracy from maturing.  
All of the aforementioned examples and statements coupled with the emphasis on 
the soldier’s moral superiority and contempt for the civilians as Jung and Dietrich (2001) 
observe, provide evidence for the shape of the civil-military relations in Turkey that is far 
from the idea of subordinated military-subordinating civilians. Indeed, it seems that 
concordance theory ‘‘between the military and the citizenry is key to understanding civil-
military relations in Turkey’’ (Narli 2004). However as Narli (2004) argues this 
concordance among the military, the government, and society is fragile, fluctuating and 
imperfect. 
Overall, the wide political and economic autonomy of the TGS, its self- 
perception as ‘the’ guardian of the secular Republic, the lack of accountability, mistrust 
in civilians and, even worse the civilian perspective that legitimizes military involvement 
in politics, coupled with the long differentiation between the right to state and to 
government, seem to be major obstacles in front of democratic consolidation in Turkey. 
The military coups and the TGS’s constant involvement in politics cannot be grasped 
without knowing the root causes of the Turkish democracy’s dilemmas. 
                                                 
1 Yenisafak Daily Newspaper 
2 www.tsk.gov.tr December 8 2005 
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III. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN TURKEY 
 
A. May 27, 1960 Military Intervention 
 
Turkey has witnessed military interventions almost with regular intervals in each 
decade after the transition to the multi-party system. Yet, Lerner and Robinson (1960) 
argued ‘‘the maintenance of civilian supremacy in republican Turkey has been a 
historical fact of the first order. Only in the Turkish Republic had there been no military 
coup, nor indeed any effective military challenge to civilian supremacy. The coup of May 
27, 1960 was the first significant break with the Ataturk tradition.’’ Such statements are 
seemingly right, but on the other hand we should keep in mind that military’s supremacy 
was not challenged until the government of the Democratic Party (DP), which came to 
power as a result of wide peasant support in 1950, and the military intervened the minute 
it felt threatened. In other words, before the DP, there was no reason to disrupt the 
military’s hegemony. However, according to Paul Henze (1993), ‘all three interventions 
resulted not from a military desire to exercise political power but from fear on the part of 
military officers that democracy was going to fail.’’ Such an argument leads one to 
conclude that the soldiers interrupt democracy for the sake of democracy pretty much like 
an overprotective parent who claims to know the best interest of her/his child. 
For Ben Lombardi (1997) ‘‘since the reforms of the late 1940s, Turkish democracy has 
repeatedly been confronted by the threat of political extremism, and the armed forces has- 
as a consequence- overthrown democratically elected governments on three separate 
occasions.’’ However letting the military define what extremism is and operate on that 
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only help to justify the interventions, which drags the country into a vicious cycle. The 
Turkish military may seem reluctant to stage coups and be less authoritarian compared to 
the ones in Latin America, but its influence could be explained by its strengthening ties 
with corporate capitalism, its resistance against the challenge posed by the rising counter 
elite as well as its self-duty to protect the regime.  
What is significant about the first military intervention of May 27, 1960 is that in 
terms of both organization and intervention process it took place outside the hierarchical 
structure of the TGS (Akyaz, 2002, p.75). For instance, one of the strongest signals of an 
approaching intervention was the march of the Military Academy students rather than 
reactions of high-ranking generals. After May 27, the military officials exercised power 
by establishing the National Unity Committee (NUC). However, in a short time, the NUC 
was divided into two between the moderates and the radicals. Generals headed by Cemal 
Gursel comprised the moderates while the lowest ranking officials were mostly radicals 
(Akyaz 2002, p.140). In order to restore discipline and hierarchy within the army, another 
unit was established: Armed Forces Union (Silahli Kuvvetler Birligi). According to 
Dogan Akyaz, the main motive was to eliminate the influence of the NUC. Despite the 
incidents and power struggles followed the formation of those units, what is significant 
here is the fragmentation within the army. 
An attempt for a military intervention took place on May 21, 1963. After this 
failed attempt, in order to discourage further cleavages among the military officials Talat 
Aydemir who was the Chief of the War Academy and Fethi Gurcan were executed.  
According to Akyaz (2002, p.234), such a message, although effective for a while, 
could not completely stop new movements, but changed their structure. The new 
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organizations focused on the character of the regime rather than the personal ambitions or 
the professional concerns of the soldiers. Regardless, what was significant in this era was 
the coup attempts that were formed independent from the hierarchical structure of the 
TGS. 
Return to civilian rule did not take a long time after the first coup in 1960. People 
supported the return in 1961, but generals warned that ‘unless a strong and credible 
government was formed; the armed forces is determined to take over the administration 
of the state’’ (Rustow 1979). With the changes made in the new 1961 constitution, the 
military regained its independence. The most important changes that gave the military 
more autonomy were making the military authority responsible to prime minister directly 
instead of the minister of defense and formation of the National Security Council as a 
constitutional body. Consequently and in accordance with the aforementioned warning, 
the military stepped in whenever civilians showed ‘incapacity.’ 
 
B. March 12, 1971 Military Intervention 
 
After the first intervention of 1960 which spoiled the hierarchical structure of the 
TGS, the generals were determined not to ‘‘stay out of the game’’ as Akyaz (2002) stated. 
From 1967 on rumors of a coup started and the Chief of Staff Cemal Tural, who was 
thought to be in preparation for an intervention, was replaced by Memduh Tagmac 
(Akyaz 2002). 
As a result of the nature of the 1961 Constitution that was relatively liberal, the 
TGNA became more pluralistic which ultimately led to radicalism because the political 
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system was not ready to absorb fragmentation in the TGNA and increasing voice of 
different groups in society. Coupled with the need for an ideology for the TGS and the 
rise of anti-capitalism among the officers (Akyaz 2002, p.389), another intervention 
became inevitable, at least in the eyes of the military. 
 The second military coup took place in 1971 after the escalation of right-left 
cleavage and political polarization. Indeed, later it became evident that an intra-army 
struggle took place before this breakdown and the extreme leftists and rightists in the 
army were purged. According to Akyaz (2002, p.432), the role of the military within the 
system and ideological concerns were visible in the internal purge after 1971, compared 
to the post-1960 period which was basically about restoring order and hierarchy of the 
junior officials. 
 The second military rule by means of an interim government was longer. It was in 
1973 that civilian parties were allowed to form governments. According to Ali 
Bayramoglu the March 12 intervention brought about three important consequences in 
terms of the civil-military relations: 
Military judiciary expanded at the expense of the civilian judiciary. As a 
result,  legal accountability of the military has increased and a separate judiciary 
system became the catalyst for the autonomy of the TGS. With a constitutional 
amendment the function and the weight of the National Security Council have 
been increased. With another constitutional amendment, the control of the 
properties that the TGS owns was taken away from the civilians and left to the 
inner-control mechanisms of the TGS. 
 
Such changes, as Bayramoglu (2004, p.80) underlines, strengthened the 
centralization and the autonomy processes for the TGS. However, on top of everything, 
for him, the most significant results of the March 12 intervention were the expansion of 
the state authority and restriction of rights and freedoms (Bayramoglu et al. 2004, p.82). 
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 C. September 12, 1980 Military Intervention 
 
The last official military intervention in 1980 has been the most destructive one in 
terms of its results because of the severe and arbitrary punishments, tight measures 
against ‘anarchy’ and strong emphasis on order and restrictions in the rights and 
freedoms. According to Bayramoglu (2004, p.82) ‘‘this era is a period that the TGS has 
become the institutionalizing, in other words, law-making power.’’ 
The relatively liberal constitution of 1961 that was designed with the advice of the 
intelligentsia let different segments of society enjoy their political rights. However the 
extreme polarization between the rightists and leftists could not have been prevented. The 
streets became the battlefield of the opposing groups that the public was almost relieved 
with the intervention of the military in September 12, 1980. The generals took fierce 
measures against ‘anarchy’ and thousands of people were arrested, some were killed 
before a proper due process and of course all political activities were banned along with 
the politicians. Kenan Evren’s statements- the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces 
and who later became the seventh president of Turkey-shed light to the arbitrary and 
unjust killings of the time. In a TV documentary he said that in order not to be unfair to 
neither the leftists nor rightists, they were careful about the evenness of the number of 
people they hung. They treated them equally when it came to capital punishment. 
  As a result, as Kalaycioglu (2001) say ‘‘the 1982 Constitution was almost fully 
determined by the military rulers of Turkey. Such an orientation toward stability and 
order eventually resulted in establishing a political regime that over-emphasized order, 
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stability, rule enforcement and executive effectiveness.’’ The 1982 Constitution is the 
only Western constitution that reversed the ‘freedom is the rule, restriction is the 
exception’ principal with its clause 13 (Bayramoglu 2004, p.80). 
Obviously one of the most critical change of the era was Law Number 2945 
which has made the National Security Council an indispensable part of the decision 
making process in the Turkish political system. Indeed Bayramoglu (2004, p.87) calls the 
General Secretariat of the National Security Council and the National Security Policy 
Document (NSPD) the heart of militarism in Turkey. 
In the post-1980 period the military acted quite pragmatically to achieve order. 
Despite the military’s extreme sensitivity about secularism after the 1980 coup religion 
courses were required at schools against the threat of ‘Godless Communists.’ As Pinar 
Tank (2005) stated ‘‘although the military condemns the use of religion for political 
purposes, it has, in the past used religion as a political tool to serve national interests’’ 
which  apparently not compatible with the previous version of secularism. 
According to Akyaz (2002, p.431), there are two general impacts of the military 
interventions on the TGS.  First is the decay in the military system in terms of hierarchy 
and discipline and second is the gradual increase in the political autonomy of the TGS. 
Consequently, the September 12 military coup was organized in accordance with the 
order and command chain of the TGS. 
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 D. The So-Called Post-Modern Military Intervention: February 28, 1997 
 
There is a widely accepted statement – now almost a cliché used by elderly to 
criticize the youngsters- that the generation of 80s is extremely depoliticized. Indeed the 
opposite was unthinkable given the measures that were taken by a military administration. 
Indeed, the military introduced a law, namely the Law on the National Security Council 
of November 1983 that limited the civilian space. According to that law national security 
entails protecting and safeguarding the state against any foreign or domestic threats, 
including any aspect of political, social, cultural and economic life (Jung 2001).  It took 
three years until the soldiers let an elected civilian government come to power. They had 
already designed a constitution and surprisingly enough it was approved by over eighty 
per cent of the population in a referendum. According to Simten Cosar (2004)  this era 
witnessed ‘the dominance of the military and the state in politics and the maintenance of 
the statist mentality.’’ In the first elections after the coup the electorate did not pay 
attention to the ‘advice’ of the military. Instead of the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) 
that is headed by a retired general, Turgut Sunalp, and favored by the soldiers, the newly 
founded Motherland Party (MP) led by a relatively conservative technocrat, Turgut Ozal 
had a surprising victory. The contradictory reactions of the public tend to reveal a hybrid 
aspect of the Turkish political culture. Although they approved the undemocratic 
constitution, they did not bring the party backed by the military into power. 
Unlike the relative political stability of 1980s, especially the second half of it with 
the single party government, 1990s displayed a chaotic and unstable political 
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environment. The whole decade witnessed two- sometimes three- party coalitions. 
However, in 1990s more important than the political fragmentation, the priority of the 
threats for the military has changed. The resurgence of Kurdish separatism and political 
Islam dominated the agenda. In Tanel Demirel’s (2004) words they ‘‘generated, once 
again, an occasion for the military to re-emphasize its guardianship of the Republic.’’ 
The military’s discomfort with the increase in the support of the pro-Islamic political 
parties had peaked when Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party (WP) became the bigger 
party of the coalition government with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party (TPP) in 1996. As 
stated earlier, the military do not hesitate to intervene and uses the breakdown in the 
political system to justify its intervention when it deems this necessary. Apparently, some 
of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s acts and statements antagonized the soldiers 
further. By the same token Demirel (2004) argues that ‘‘ingrained in such a culture’- read 
as the mentality- ‘soldiers tend to regard the overthrow of elected governments as 
lamentable, but nevertheless necessary when certain conditions are obtained.’’ When 
such conditions were there again, according to the military in late 1990s the intervention 
became necessary. 
Unlike the violent methods pursued in the previous military interventions of 1960, 
1971 and 1980, the military resorted to a relatively subtle method. It was almost like a 
very rigorous public relations campaign. As Narli (2001) underlines ‘‘the army also 
engages in public relations work by promoting ‘national security concept’ to raise 
citizens’ consciousness about internal and external threats that it identifies.’’ In 
accordance with that, during the process certain newspapers, TV channels, columnists 
and intellectuals that were thought to be affiliated with political Islam and separatism 
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were isolated by the military. Some liberal journalists were laid off due to the military’s 
discomfort with their unorthodox stance on sensitive issues. The lists of the companies or 
institutions that were thought to be the enemies of the secular Republic were circulated in 
the media. Some firms were labeled as ‘green capital’ (green representing the 
fundamentalist Muslims) and the military openly asked people not to do business with 
them. It is hard to grasp how the criteria to determine the color of capital are set let alone 
the absurdity of such categorization for the functioning of a market economy.  
According to Ali Bayramoglu (2004, p.97), February 28 is an attempt for the 
soldiers to seek legitimacy not only by means of arms and the support of legislation, but 
also by the mobilization of public opinion with the help of the media. Consequently, the 
TGS adopted a new action plan which aimed to follow and scrutinize the activities that 
might threaten the secular nature of the Republic by means of memoranda named andic 
and units like Bati Calisma Grubu (BCG) both of which created by the military mainly to 
scrutinize the reactionary activities. Andic was the tool of directing media to fabricate 
news for serving the TGS’ purposes. BCG was named by General Cevik Bir and 
responsible for reporting reactionary activities prior to the Feb 28 post-modern coup. 
Finally on February 28, 1997, after a long National Security Council (NSC) meeting in 
the Presidential Cankaya Palace the military strongly warned the Erbakan government. 
Soon later the resignation of Erbakan followed. Indeed, as Soli Ozel (2003) states ‘‘with 
the threat of an actual coup hanging in the air, the military waged a relentless public 
relations campaign that turned society against the Welfare-True Path coalition 
government and eventually forced the resignation on June 18 of Erbakan and his 
cabinet.’’ As columnist Cengiz Candar named and one of the high ranking and influential 
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generals of the February 28 era, Erol Ozkasnak, confirmed later this was a ‘post-modern’ 
military coup.  Under such circumstances it was understandable for the military not to 
welcome impositions on its role in politics even though the EU project is totally 
compatible with Ataturk’s legacy. 
What was disappointing during the whole February 28 process was the attitude of 
the intelligentsia and civilians in general. As Demirel (2004) states: 
 
During the February 28 process, main opposition parties (The Motherland 
Party and the Party of the Democratic Left) were rather circumspect and 
consented to the military’s increased role. When soldiers’ words and deeds 
harassed not only the incumbent coalition but the democratic political system as a 
whole, they did little to protest. 
 
As of today, Turkey witnessed three military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 
1980 and a so-called ‘post modern’ coup on February 28, 1997. After all the military 
interventions military chose to return the rule to civilians. Indeed some scholars think that 
these short military rulings are the proof of military’s commitment to democracy. Umit 
Cizre (1997) thinks that ‘‘the most crucial feature of the Turkish military’s political 
autonomy, which in turn distinguishes it from armies elsewhere in the Third World, is its 
acceptance of the legitimacy of both democracy and civilian rule…It is not praetorian: it 
has not tried to undermine democracy or usurp civilian authority.’’ This observation is 
accurate, of course, as long as we settle for a comparison with the authoritarian rules, not 
consolidated democracies. 
It should also be noted that their duty is almost a self-appointed one. As Jenkins 
(2001) summarizes Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law of 1961 superficially 
charges the military with responsibility for protecting the nature of the Turkish regime, 
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including the Kemalist principles of territorial integrity, secularism, and republicanism. 
Article 35 states: ‘‘the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and preserve the 
Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the constitution. Article 85/1 of 
the directive states: ‘‘it is the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces to protect the Turkish 
homeland and the republic, by arms when necessary, against internal and external 
threats’’(Jenkins 2001). 
The Armed Forces declares the enemies of the Republic by means of the National 
Security Policy Document (NSPD) which is updated in every five years. It is well known 
by now that the military is the guardian not only against the external enemies, but also the 
internal ones. As Jenkins (2001) elaborates ‘‘the definition of security is expansive and 
includes perceived dangers to both the country and the character of the regime. As a 
result, national security is seen not just as the defense of Turkey’s territory and its 
political and economic interests, but also the preservation of its Kemalist legacy.’’ 
Consequently, all the three official coup d’etats and the post-modern intervention of Feb 
28, 1997 targeted internal enemies. As Demirel (2004) points out ‘‘in the language of 
Turkish military the civilian world was characterized by disorder, the pursuit of naked 
self-interest, corruption and imprudence.’’ Predictably, as Demirel (2004) continues, 
‘‘this perception of the civilian world impedes military acceptance of civilian 
supremacy.’’ 
In addition to the NSPD- which is updated in every five years unless an 
unexpected threat emerges- the military exerts power by means of the National Security 
Council (NSC), which was also established after the 1960 coup. The last policy 
imposition by the military took place on February 28, 1997. On that date, as Lombardi 
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(1997) points out the NSC, which is dominated by the armed forces, demanded that 
Erbakan, the then Prime Minister, curtail the ‘tide the radical Islam.’ It is still early to 
evaluate all dimensions of this latest intervention, but the Turkish media, recalling the 
events of 1971, referred to the outcome of the NSC meeting as a ‘soft coup.’ 
As much as the military enjoys a wide range of autonomy, it is not possible to 
argue for a monolithic structure within the army. Occasionally rumors on the internal 
division within the TGS come to the surface when a conflictual issue is on the agenda 
although the high commanders vehemently reject such rumors. For instance, when a high 
ranking general Cetin Dogan criticized the possibility for Turkey to send troops to Iraq in 
August 2003, The Chief of Staff, Hilmi Ozkok, said the following: ‘It’d be better if he 
(Dogan) made such a comment after he retired. The prerogative to talk on behalf of the 
TGS is designated. There is no disagreement within the TGS.’’ 3
However, in For the People, Of the People and By the Military: The Regime 
Structure of Modern Turkey, Jacoby (2003)claims that ‘‘the divided nature of the officer 
corps is essential to understand the regime types that have emerged in Turkey since the 
Second World War (semi-authoritarian incorporation and autocratic militarism). He 
focuses on the military elite’s growing economic interests and the effects of this on the 
civilian sphere as well as concluding that bifurcated governmental approach contributed 
to the internal divisions within the officer corps and the perpetuation of the high 
command’s position in the domestic and international order.’’ However such divisions 
have not grown to threaten the military’s unity at large. 
Although the Turkish military has almost a monolithic ideological stand in 
compliance with the Kemalist principle obvious differences among the high rank generals 
                                                 
3 Hurriyet August 25,2003 
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intensified in the 1960s. After the successful purge of the ‘extremist’ leftist and rightist 
officers starting from late 1960s, there as almost no dissident voices left. Indeed, the 1971 
intervention was seemingly against the Suleyman Demirel government, but it was a result 
of a struggle between intra- military fractions.  
Today, rather than a soft liner vs. hard liner distinction, it is possible to talk about 
a hard liner vs. harder liner disagreement over the reaction to the civilian world and the 
JDP government in particular. However, it would be inaccurate to argue that the 
discomfort of the harder liners -such as the current Chief of the Land Forces Yasar 
Buyukanit or the retired hawkish generals like Aytac Yalman, Tuncer Kilinc and Hursit 
Tolon – only stems from a ruling party with a troublesome legacy. It is not surprising to 
hear warning messages from those generals. Former National Security Council General 
Secretary Tuncer Kilinc often raised the red flag over the Shariah threat. During his 
handover ceremony in August 2003 he stated that ‘‘although the secular Republic is 80 
years old, Turkey should be loyal to principles of Ataturk, there are still some circles 
seeking the Shariah.’’4 A couple of days before him, the Chief of the Aegean Army 
Hursit Tolon warned the people with fundamentalist aspirations without giving specific 
names and said that they saw the sneaky disguise.5Another harder liner claimed that ‘‘the 
TGS is not only the guarantee of the Republic, but also democracy’’6 while the relatively 
moderate Chief of Staff Hilmi Ozkok confessed that ‘‘the military interventions are not 
the solution. Then solution should be sought in the people.’’7
                                                 
4 Milliyet August 26,2003 
5 Radikal August 21,2003 
6 www.turkishpress.com September 09,2003 
7 Hurriyet August 27,2003 
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Apparently, the shape of military interventions in Turkey changed depending on 
the priorities of the TGS and the intra-power struggle. Whether Turkey will be prone to 
other democratic breakdowns is quite dependent on its EU bid which will be analyzed in 
the next section. 
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 IV. THE  EU CHALLENGE TO THE MILITARY SUPREMACY IN 
TURKEY 
 
Given the long and troublesome history of civil-military relations and the 
supremacy of the TGS in Turkey, there is little doubt that the demands and reforms that 
the EU membership requires are a challenging test for the Turkish democracy. In other 
words, the EU membership is the ultimate battleground between the proponents of the 
status quo and a totally civilian democracy. 
As far as the role of the military in Turkish politics is concerned, during the EU 
accession process, there seems to be almost a consensus that the military will have to 
diminish its weight and withdraw from politics. Ersel Aydinli, Nihat Ali Ozcan and 
Dogan Akyaz (2006) stated such an expectation as follows: ‘‘ The EU reforms have 
called for a virtual revolution of the military’s mindset, requiring that the military’s 
traditionally expansive interpretation of its mission to protect the country be redefined in 
a much more narrow way.’’ It is worth to consider their article seriously because of the 
authors’ widely- believed access to insider perspective of the TGS.  
Even after the 1980 coup, the idea that ‘‘should an intervention happen, military 
government is likely to be as brief as it was earlier, for at least the military have learned 
their lesson.’’ (Klieman 1980) was there.  Before the imposition of the Copenhagen 
Criteria on Turkey, there was an optimistic belief that military was ready to go into the 
barracks. For example in 1996 Heper and Guney (1996) wrote that: 
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The Turkish military has increasingly extricated itself from politics 
primarily because (1) it had historically been an instigator of the project of 
Westernization that included democratization; (2) it came under increasing 
pressure from both Turkey’s western allies and a group of intellectuals in Turkey 
to adopt a hands-off policy in politics; (3) the military itself came to the 
conclusion that democracy cannot be consolidated through military intervention 
and (4) the military’s involvement in politics leads to its loss of prestige in the 
polity and society and to a lowering of morale within the military. 
 
Despite the accuracy of some of the above diagnoses and the military’s often-
supportive stance towards the EU and merit of the civilian democracy, especially the EU 
battle has been proving that the military has not made its mind yet and is not ready to 
withdraw from politics since the stakes are high. Indeed the following statement supports 
such an argument:  
If Kurdish separatists, failing to see a future for themselves in a European 
Turkey, continue to resort to violence, the Turkish military might hang on to its 
remaining prerogatives in the name of national security. Should the Islamists 
begin to fill in the gaps in state institutions created by the military’s retreat, the 
TGS could decide to cling on to its power (Aydinli et al. 2006).   
 
Unfortunately the increasing terrorist activities in the Southeast coupled with the 
provocative statements by Kurdish politicians of the region as well as the ascending 
tension over the protection of the regime provide the TGS sufficient excuses to keep its 
dominance in politics. Indeed it is obvious that the military will always consider itself the 
ultimate guardian: ‘‘ As the country’s ultimate guardian, the military will carefully 
balance he EU’s demands for reform, especially those regarding cultural diversity with 
national security’’ (Aydinli et al. 2006). It seems that Turkey needs to go a long way to 
debate whether there is a need for a ‘guardian’ to protect the regime -especially from its 
citizens- in the first place. 
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The EU membership is indeed in compliance with the goals Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, the Founder of the Turkish Republic set for Turkey.  Consequently as Aydinli et 
al.  (2006) state  ‘‘like the civilian authorities the Turkish military supported the EU 
membership. Not only would accession be the crowning achievement of Turkey’s 
modernization, but the process leading to it would also offer a way to respond to several 
challenges facing the country.’’  Although after the Helsinki Summit of 1999, then Chief 
of Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu announced the TGS’s support for the EU membership 
process and Turkish- EU relations soon became the most discussed items at NSC 
meetings and the council’s press releases declared EU membership as a national goal and 
official ‘‘state policy’’ (Aydinli et al. 2006) it seems that the establishment in Turkey is 
not at ease with the prospective compromises on the issues like Cyprus, expansion of 
religious expressions, the Kurdish problem, and the subordination of the military to the 
civilians.   As the EU membership negotiations continue intermittently, high-ranking 
generals send conflicting messages which engender to the rumors of disagreement within 
the TGS. However, the following remark could be read almost like a response to such 
rumors: ‘‘Despite slight divergences of opinion among some of its generals, the Turkish 
military basically makes decisions as a unitary, rational actor and speaks with one voice’’ 
(Aydinli et al. 2006). Regardless of that, at the end of the 1990s, the civilian and military 
elites found a common cause- EU membership- behind which to rally (Aydinli et al. 
2006). As Ozel (2003) portrays in his After the Tsunami the traumas of the 1990s -
frustration with the corrupted state, the post-modern coup, devastating earthquakes and 
economic crises  contributed to the commitment for the EU.  
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Given the high stakes involved in the EU membership for both the civilians and 
the military, it is essential to understand the background of Turkey’s journey to the EU. 
Turkey has been flirting with Europe since 1958, a period of almost half a century which 
is full of break ups and disappointments on the part of the former. The relationship turned 
into an obsession for Turkey to the extent that it almost began to desire the membership 
in spite of the Europeans.  
For over two centuries Turks associated modernization with Europeanization 
despite the existence of a love-hate relationship with Europe. Even today, many Turks 
believe that Europeans would be happy with a divided and weak Turkey due to the fears 
that date back to the end of World War I during which a partition plan of Anatolia was 
forced on the defeated Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless a rejection from the ideal role 
model leads to more frustration than Europeans could imagine. As Jenkins (2001) states 
‘‘accession means more than mere economic or political benefits. It is a question of 
identity, of being able to number themselves amongst what they perceived as the elite of 
nations: which is why criticism by, and continued exclusion from the EU often triggers 
such emotional reactions inside Turkey.’’ 
Although Turkey’s direction has been westward officially since 1920s as Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk set to become a modern state it is hard to say that all segments of the 
society wholeheartedly support the full EU membership. On top of the list of skeptics is 
the politically powerful Turkish military. Supposedly the goal of EU membership fits the 
objectives of the Turkish military since it means to become westernized.  However what 
we witness is a power struggle between the conservative JDP government that seems to 
adopt the EU project for its own pragmatic purposes and the establishment at large.  
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Especially after the rapid reform movement that was undertaken by the JDP 
government with the support of country’s business class and the media left the military 
almost alone along with a couple of retired and militantly Kemalist bureaucrats who 
claim that the EU will harm the independence and sovereignty of Turkey. However there 
is a point in the argument that ‘‘none of the reforms the EU still requires of the Turkish 
government can be achieved without the military’s backing’’(Aydinli et al. 2006). Yet it 
is worth questioning the degree of power loss for the TGS given the wide autonomy that 
it still enjoys notwithstanding the reforms.  
There is no doubt that the Turkish elite decided to turn its face towards Europe 
starting from the late Ottoman era. Since the 1830s, reform movements of the Turkish 
political elite have been marked by a close link between modernization and 
westernization. The political elite of that period, observing the forces unleashed by 
European revolutions, concluded that pre-modern Ottoman institutions would not survive 
the onslaught of Western modernity (Ugur, 1999). Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and 
since then tried to be a part of post World War II Western institutions. For Mehmet Ugur 
(1999) ‘‘relations with the West became not only a reflection of the Turkish political elite, 
but also an anchor that would reduce the probability of deviations from the modernization 
trajectory.’’ He (1999) also acknowledged that ‘‘the Turkish policy makers of the time 
came to realize that the lack of popular support for the state-led modernization strategy 
was a major weakness that would be exacerbated by the introduction of a multi-party 
regime.’’ More than the increasing frustration of the non-elite majority at home, the 
international conjuncture marked by democratization movements forced Turkey to 
transition to the multi-party system which could beg a separate discussion. 
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As far as Turkish foreign policy is concerned, there is a consensus on its nature as 
Jenkins (2001) points out ‘‘the overall orientation of Turkish foreign policy has remained 
unchanged since the 1920s when Ataturk identified becoming a modern, Westernized, 
European state as an ideal to which Turkey should aspire. Today most Turks regard the 
EU membership as the criterion for being truly European.’’ Hence Turkey applied to the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958 after the Treaty of Rome and became an 
associate member in 1963. However since then the accession process turned into a 
gridlock and Turkey has been convinced that Europe was reluctant to admit it in the first 
place. As Arikan (2003)  stated ‘‘Turkish point of view tended to highlight the failures of 
the EU to fulfill its obligations under the Association Agreement (AA) and the Additional 
Protocol (AP).’’ On the other hand, the EU started to investigate human rights violations 
and raise the issue of democratization in Turkey after the military coup of 1980. However 
like so many others Arikan (2003) believes that ‘‘the EP used these vexed questions as a 
pretext to discourage Turkey’s membership expectation by sending a message to Turkey 
through its resolution that she should not rush towards full membership.’’ Even though 
Turkey’s application for full membership was rejected in 1989 it was determined to join 
the EU. After the rejection Turgut Ozal, then Prime Minister, asked the question loud in 
everybody’s mind: Is it we are Muslim and they are Christians and they don’t say that?  
Indeed, in terms of identity, Huntington (1993) seems right in his juxtaposition of 
Turkey as a torn country. In his Clash of Civilizations he argues that ‘‘some countries 
have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity, but they are divided over whether their 
society belongs to one civilization or another.’’ In the EU case as Ugur (1999) suggests 
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‘‘Turkish elite’s claim that Turkey is a Western country is shared neither by the Turkish 
population nor by the Western elite.’’ 
Turkey signed the Customs Union agreement in 1995, but then again the EU 
chose to pass over Turkey’s candidacy for full membership in December 1997. It took 
until the Helsinki Summit of 1999 for the EU to accept Turkey officially as a candidate. 
Indeed, only after Helsinki, Turkey began to realize the serious compromises that it is 
asked to make regarding Turkey’s chronic problems. Although the Europeans, both in 
informal and formal documents and negotiations, had consistently criticized the role of 
the military in Turkish politics, talk of actually curbing it did not begin in earnest until 
after 1999 (Aydinli et al. 2006).  
  On December 17, 2004 Turkey was given a date to discuss whether to start the 
negotiations or not despite mutual doubts on both Turkey and the EU about the other’s 
commitment. In the end of an equally tough period marked by crises, mutual mistrust and 
doubts, on October 3, 2005 the EU granted Turkey to start the accession negotiations 
without a membership guarantee, a process, however, ended in membership for the other 
candidates. 
Obviously some European states led by France have strong reservations for 
Turkey’s admission. Former President of France Valery Giscard d’Estaing even claimed 
that Turkey’s membership would be ‘the end of Europe.’ Similarly, in the aftermath of 
the October 3 decision, French President Jacques Chirac stated that Turkey needs a 
cultural revolution while the Christian Democrats in Germany were in favor of a formula 
that they called ‘privileged partnership.’ Indeed it was Austria that openly expressed 
strong reservation on Turkey’s membership almost on behalf of the bigger countries in 
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the EU and it finally managed to add the phrase ‘absorption capacity’, which was not 
used for any other candidates. According to the Council of European Union’s decision 
dated October 3, 2005 one of the most significant governing principles for the 
negotiations is as follows: 
As agreed at the European Council in December 2004, these negotiations 
are based on Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.  The shared objective of 
the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the 
outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to 
all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey 
is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be 
ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the 
strongest possible bond.8
 
Following such official statements, high-level EU politicians kept making 
remarks on Turkey’s obligations and about the nature of the negotiations. The President 
of the EU Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso said that ‘‘Turkey has to win the hearts and 
minds of the Europeans given the low support level for Turkey’s membership in many 
EU countries.’’9 Despite the EU’s close scrutiny, Turkey seemed to fall into the trap of 
complacency with the relief of the October 3 decision which was also recognized by Olli 
Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, who made a wake up call by saying that ‘‘the 
party is over and it is time to work.’’10 Given all these statements it seems that 
reservations on Turkey will not be over any time soon and the negotiations process will 
be full of intermittent crises.  Indeed, as Aydinli et al. (2006) point out ‘‘the EU itself 
may be the main threat to further reform. If it fails to show as great a commitment as 
                                                 
8 Council of European Union Enlargement: Accession negotiations with Turkey: General EU Position 
October 3,2005 
9  http://europa.eu.int/comm/index_en.htm October 3,2005 
10 Milliyet November 24,2005 
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Turkey has shown so far, the EU could jeopardize the grand consensus that brought 
Turkey’s military and civilian authorities together.’’ 
However it is not only the Europeans who have suspicions about the 
consequences of Turkey’s membership. As Jenkins (2001)  points out ‘‘the military has 
adopted a more ambivalent attitude towards EU membership’’ since ‘‘the wording of the 
offer effectively made Turkish accession conditional on the resolution of all of its 
disputes with Greece, either bilaterally by 2004 or, if this proved impossible, by allowing 
them to be settled by the International Court of Justice at the Hague; something which 
Ankara had previously refused to do.’’ Yet the Turkish government, and even the 
military regime, responded positively to the European concerns and criticism as Arikan 
(2003) states. His argument that Turkey was interested in the EU, not only for economic 
reasons, but also for political, security and ideological reasons (Arikan 2003)  has a 
strong point. This seems to partially explain the military’s support for the accession 
efforts. In response to criticisms towards the military that it constitutes one of the biggest 
barriers in front of Turkey’s desire to become a EU member, Yasar Buyukanit, Chief of 
the Land Forces and a vocal and radical general, responded in a way to support the above 
argument: ‘‘The European Union is the geo-political and geo-strategic ultimate condition 
for the realization of the target of modernization which Ataturk chose for the Turkish 
nation.’’11 However he did not forget to make a warning by adding that ‘‘those who see 
the European Union and the supreme ideals of this union as a means of realizing their 
archaic and separatist goals are doomed to be disappointed.’’12
                                                 
11 Turkish Daily News May 30,2003 
12 Ibid 
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Unexpectedly, for many observers of the Turkish politics, Turkey has started an 
ambitious reform movement to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria and is proud of what it has 
achieved in a short time period: 
Thus, the vigorous agenda of reform pursued by Turkey and the colossal 
legislative effort realized, which has included such measures as the 
comprehensive Constitutional amendments in October 2001 and May 2004, new 
Civil and Penal Codes and eight reform packages, has been acknowledged by the 
Commission’s recommendation.13
 
However it is possible to see Turkey’s resentment for additional demands and 
double standard in the MFA’s official statements:  
While some of the Commission’s proposals relating to the negotiation 
process and procedures differ from past practice and criteria and methods applied 
to the other candidates, Turkey believes that at the end of the day the principle of 
“pacta sund servanda” and the letter and spirit of the Helsinki European Council 
Conclusions referred to above will be upheld by the EU Member States.14
 
Despite the government’s pride in the reform packages adopted in a short time, 
hard- line generals made their unrest clear such as the former National Security Secretary 
General Tuncer Kilinc. In the aftermath of the reforms curbing the power of the NSC by 
limiting the duties of the NSC secretary general to secretarial organization, as opposed to 
his previous tasks which included ‘monitoring’ and ‘coordinating’ the implementation of 
government decisions on security matters, Tuncer said that ‘with the reforms, the 
council…has kept its place legally, but was left functionless.’’15 Notwithstanding the 
military’s existing supremacy, the reforms were unprecedented and hard to absorb for the 
TGS. Aydinli et al. (2006)  argue that ‘‘not all these adjustments have been greeted with 
open arms, but the TGS has largely compiled with the EU’s demands even though doing 
                                                 
13 www.mfa.gov.tr  
14 Ibid 
15 Agence France Presse August 25, 2003  
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so has forced it to let go of power it had felt necessary to build up and carefully guard for 
decades.’’ 
Needless to say, prevailing military supremacy is one of the main impediments in 
front of EU membership. As Cizre (2004) states ‘‘in all EU originating reports and 
documents on Turkey, there are four strictly institutional areas that are targeted for 
reform: the position of the Chief of the General Staff, the role of the National Security 
Council, the composition and jurisdiction of the State Security Courts and the emergency 
rule in the Southeast.’’ The last two problems were ameliorated during the last reform 
period. However, Cizre (2004) argues that ‘‘the high command, being perfectly aware 
that the voice of the military cannot be altered just by changing the composition of the 
Council, has supported the idea of including more civilian ministers into its folds.’’ 
Cizre’s argument seems more convincing than claiming that ‘‘ recent changes have 
already dramatically curbed the power of the Turkish military in several of its traditional 
areas of influence and reduced its long-standing authority in some civilian 
institutions’’(Aydinli et al. 2006) given the de facto influence of the TGS on every aspect 
of Turkish state as well as the people’s mindsets. 
In the 1990s the military began to perceive Kurdish nationalism and Islamic 
resurgence as the most important threats against the unitary secular Republic. For Jacoby 
(2003) Turkish Armed Forces often have a contradictory vision of Islam which is 
‘‘suitable for a sense of individual morality and order, but inappropriate for a shared 
sense of collective consciousness.’’  As a result of such a perception, the generals often 
react to statements by the politicians and the EU demands. In August 2003, The Chief of 
the First Army, General Cetin Dogan, directed attention to the external pressure and their 
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changing nature by accusing foreign countries of being a Trojan horse in Turkey and said 
that they would ‘‘break the hands that threatens the TGS.’’16
It is apparent as Jenkins (2001) states that ‘‘the military’s main fear is that the 
relaxation of Turkey’s often draconian restrictions on freedom of speech would fuel anti-
secular and separatist, primarily Kurdish nationalist, sentiments.’’ Military officials try to 
justify their reservations by arguing that ‘‘no other European country faces the same 
threats as Turkey and that the Copenhagen criteria should be implemented taking into 
consideration the interests and realities of the country’’ (Jenkins 2001). For the soldiers, 
their role as the guardian and the protector of the regime makes it a natural reflex to take 
the measurements against threats. As a result of skepticism about the EU’s motives ‘‘in 
early 2000 the Turkish General Staff (TGS) established a Working Group on EU 
membership. But it soon made it clear that it had reservations not about the principle of 
EU membership- which it sees as the realization of Ataturk’s dream of Turkey being 
accepted as a modern, European state- but rather the possible impact of the fulfillment of 
the Copenhagen criteria on the nature of the Turkish regime’’ (Jenkins 2001). 
 Contrary to his previous statements on the EU and as if supporting the above 
argument, Yasar Buyukanit lashed out at the European Parliament in September 2005. He 
said ‘‘I strongly condemn the mentality and expression of the European Parliament which 
labeled our struggle against terrorism as aggressive military operations.’’17 In the same 
speech, like all of his colleagues, he warned Turkey against the two big national security 
threats. Predictably they were religious fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism. On the 
other hand, Turkey-European Union Joint Parliamentary Commission Co-Chair Joost 
                                                 
16 Aksam 19 Agustos 2003 
17 Sabah September 26, 2005 
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Lagendijk has been accusing the military of blocking the way to Europe. In December 
2005, he claimed that ‘‘the military does not mind fighting with the PKK because the 
armed struggle keeps the military on the agenda and in the center.’’18
In contrast, some scholars of Turkish politics seem to hold naïve ideas about the 
military. For instance Frank Tachau (cited in Heper&Guney 1996)  argues that ‘‘the 
military tried everything it could so that they would not feel obliged to escalate their 
moderating role to a guardianship role- taking power into their hands, clearing up ‘the 
mess’, and then returning to their barracks.’’ Yet Heper and Guney (1996) think that ‘‘in 
Turkey, despite the increased democratization of the regime, the military’s prerogatives 
were kept almost intact. And the military continued to use the NSC to influence 
government policy in those matters that they considered critical for the internal and 
external security of the country.’’ 
To circumcise those powers Turkey, as Gorvett (2001) points out, has to ‘‘wind 
down the military’s political role, grant rights to Kurds and other minorities, and 
dramatically shrink the size and power of the state’’ in order to meet the Copenhagen 
Criteria which is a set of economic, social and political rules. 
During the highly controversial ‘Operation White Energy’ which was undertaken 
in the 1990s as a result of corruption charges for some politicians in slate bids, the Prime 
Minister Mesut Yilmaz claimed that ‘Operation White Energy’ was a veiled attempt by 
those opposed to EU membership to discredit Turkey’s pro-EU civilian rulers. As a 
response, the General Staff statement categorically denied that the military was anything 
but staunch Europeans. However, on the same day, across town, War Academies 
Commander General Nahit Senoglu was voicing his doubt over the EU membership 
                                                 
18 Milliyet December 17,2005 
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during a seminar on the proposed new European defense force that ‘‘ no single EU 
country is willing to accept Turkey’s EU membership.’’ According to the general the 
transition toward a European defense identity, and the exclusion of NATO member 
Turkey from its decision making structure, were evidence of ‘unfair and disloyal 
attitudes’ toward Turkey. For him decisions on Cyprus and the Aegean in Turkey’s EU 
accession requirements were ‘of such a nature as might harm Turkey’s national 
interests’’(Gorvett 2001). 
 
A. A Threshold: Helsinki Summit and its Aftermath 
 
 It should be clear by now that it would not be rational for Turkey to alienate itself 
from the European security system and rely totally on the US not only for ideological, but 
also strategic reasons. When this rationale was combined with the JDP’s possible 
interests- such as not facing the threat of being banned from politics and being less 
cautious about its constituency’s demands- from an irreversible process of 
democratization, acceleration in the reforms took place. 
Immediately after the November 2002 elections the JDP set the EU membership 
as the first goal for the government. The enthusiasm and commitment to change that 
marked the post 2002 elections might have made   Ozel (2003) rightfully write that ‘‘the 
push for change, the claims of a rising counter elite to a place in the power structure, and 
the popularity of EU membership all point to a fundamental fact: Having undergone a 
rather unsettling two decades, Turkey is now ready to shake off the shackles of the 1982 
military-drafted constitution as well as the mentality that framed it.’’ 
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It is skeptical to doubt the JDP’s commitment to the EU membership since it 
would secure its existence in a more open and politically liberal society although it has 
been stumbling in realizing all the legal changes that were aimed to ensure political 
liberalization not only because it does not have a structured roadmap, but also has been 
cautious not to alert the military. 
In Turks Say No to Europe: Can’t We Just Come as We Are? Craig Smith (2003) 
says that in Turkey in all instances short-lived interventions were designed to reestablish 
civilian rule and appreciates the reforms: ‘‘ In July 2004 the Turkish Parliament voted to 
curb the political power of the military and increase freedom of expression, signaling a 
significant step away from army domination of Turkish politics. The withdrawal of the 
military from politics appears to be a conscious decision designed to allow the emergence 
of a fuller democracy in order to secure the coveted prize of European membership.’’  
Although there have been important changes in the structure of the military dominated 
NSC it is hard to say that military’s status is shattered. Demirel (2004) thinks that the 
lingering dilemma of Turkish politics, throughout the 1990s, was the restructuring of 
civil-military relations. Yet it has not really been on the agenda of Turkish politics. For 
him the government so far has ‘‘hardly touched on essential military prerogatives such as 
making the Chief of the General Staff responsible to the Defense Minister instead of the 
Prime Minister, instituting real parliamentary control over defense spending and 
particularly military- backed foundations, subjecting the decisions of the Higher Council 
to judicial review and so on’’ (Demirel 2004).  
All these are fair arguments and obviously no government has shown the courage 
to question the ‘sacred mission and prerogatives’ of the Armed Forces. However when 
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we think of the collective memory as far as the military is concerned, politicians’ 
reservations for a radical change are understandable. Even if the reform is made as 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) point out ‘‘the most difficult immediate problems are 
how to administer justice to those directly responsible for past acts of repression and how 
to assert some degree of civilian control over decisions about promotion and resource 
allocation within the armed forces.’’ Obviously the changes are only one dimension of 
providing complete civilian supremacy and in Turkey that seems out of sight no matter 
how much pressure the EU criteria brings unless they become irreversible for good. 
Despite the question of military dominance Rustow (1979)  is right to assert that 
‘‘Turkey’s liveliest cultural links have been with Europe rather than with the Middle East 
and Turkey’s society and politics are profoundly committed to democratic elections, 
freedom of expression and political equality.’’ 
Like many other students of Turkish politics Jenkins (2001) is convinced that 
‘‘the Turkish military is unlikely to be prepared to relinquish the future of the country to 
its civilian politicians. For the foreseeable future it is likely to remain in the political 
arena, not so much initiating policy as ensuring that it remains within what the military 
believes to be acceptable parameters.’’ There is little doubt that the military’s power has 
been challenged especially with the fulfillment of the European demands although most 
of the previous decade witnessed an increase in military’s dominance as Ozel (2003) also 
acknowledges: ‘‘The military gradually redefined domestic problems as national-security 
threats, with the influence of the armed forces visibly increasing throughout political 
life.’’ Yet, the National Security Policy Document for 2001 included not only Turkey’s 
goal of gaining membership in the EU, but also a major concession by the TGS on the 
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Kurdish question according to Aydinli et al. The document stated, ‘‘our citizens, who are 
united under the banner of Turkish national identity, should have their cultural and local 
linguistic characteristics be considered as individual rights and freedoms’’ (Aydinli et al 
2006). Apparently, as Ozel (2003) states the EU helped democratization by asking 
Turkey to become more committed to democratic reform as a sine qua non of the 
membership process along with the influence of internal dynamics. The biggest evidence 
of those internal dynamics was the 2002 election results. As Ozel (2003) mentions 
‘‘Turkish voters had swept aside a whole cohort of established, but corruption-tainted 
parties, possibly in defiance of the country’s politically powerful military, and opted 
instead for a group of self-avowed ‘Muslim Democrats’ led by the charismatic former 
mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.’’ According to a study conducted by political 
scientist Yilmaz Esmer (cited in Ozel 2003) most of the JDP voters favored the EU 
accession even if they doubted that the EU was sincere about the process. Yet again as 
Ozel states ‘‘the military issued its warning via the chief of the General Staff. In a speech 
citing the usual concerns about ‘national security’, he attacked the government’s Cyprus 
and EU policies and above all condemned the possibility of Islamic rule.’’ 
Although the military enjoyed extended exercise of power in the 1990s it was the 
decade that the business class withdrew its support in favor of the EU. As Ozel (2003) 
points out  ‘‘the prominent industrialists’ and businessmen’s association known as 
TUSIAD, which had supported the 1980 military coup, added its voice to the democracy 
chorus, noting that Turkey’s future prosperity hinged on EU accession and thus on further 
democratization’’ which means the loss of one of the crucial fronts for the military. 
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As previously stated the JDP government will try to challenge the privileged 
position of the military by means of reforms demanded by the EU as much as it can. Ozel 
(2003) explains the logic behind the JDP’s attitude as follows: ‘‘the only way for this 
party to survive in power and endure is through a liberal transformation of the Turkish 
polity and its civilization. This explains why the JDP’s drive for EU accession is genuine: 
It is a matter of enlightened self-interest.’’ However along with the psychological barrier 
of politicians to challenge the authority of the military as Jenkins (2001) states, the JDPs 
inexperience in crisis management, the public’s indifference or inability at large and the 
establishment’s resistance make things at home harder as if there are not enough 
problems on the EU side of the equation.    
It is true that full EU membership will help Turkey to consolidate liberalism both 
economically and politically. However the danger is that there is over expectation from 
what the EU would bring to Turkey, which might eventually lead to disappointment in 
society. As Ozel (2003) states ‘‘EU membership became all the more prized as an aid to 
this cause (drive toward an accountable, transparent, and efficient government ruled by 
law); some even saw it as a panacea.’’  
Although Turkey began to show signs of obsession with the EU issue and tries to 
become European despite Europe itself, the EU goal would serve as a strong catalyst for 
further liberalization, which would be in and of itself an achievement for Turkey even if 
it does not become a full member. However, since the stakes are higher than ever before, 
the EU battle seems to be the most severe one in the war between the center and the 
periphery. The Semdinli incident, the punishment for the prosecutor of Van who dared to 
insinuate responsibility for illegal acts by General Buyukanit in his indictment and the 
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efforts to sharpen polarization in society over the Kurdish question and secularism could 
be read as the reflections of the last battle. There is little doubt that the winner will 
determine not only the shape of civil-military relations, but the sanity and welfare of 
Turkish citizens as well as the nature of Turkish democracy. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
The dominant role of the military in contemporary Turkish politics is almost a 
constant. Without a doubt, the Turkish military has always been in the center of politics. 
However, it would be inaccurate and insufficient to analyze civil-military relations in 
Turkey solely around the traditional literature. Since the Western civil-military literature 
is based on the feudal experiences of Europe, as well as the American case, it is 
misleading to expect that the weight of the military in politics would decrease with more 
professionalization in Turkey. In that respect, the Theory of Concordance, which 
considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and the various other 
possibilities for civil-military relations, becomes more explanatory for the Turkish case. 
The theory does not assume that separate civil-military spheres are necessary to prevent 
military intervention. Despite its explanatory power, for the sake of Turkish democracy it 
makes more sense to aim for complete military subordination to the elected civilians. 
However, the coup/no-coup dichotomy is not sufficient to prove civilian supremacy. 
Often, the military exercised power in Turkey –in compliance with the definition of 
second face of power- without resorting to arms. 
Turkish democracy seems to have a hybrid nature and a mixed performance 
despite the relatively early transition to democracy. For the establishment at large and the 
TGS in particular, it could be argued that the goal is to secure the Republic at the expense 
of democracy. The military perceives itself as the guardians of secular Turkey due to a 
self-ascribed duty. The TGS does not hesitate to intervene in politics when it deems it 
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necessary which is itself, quite an arbitrary criterion. However, it is not only the 
perception of the soldiers, but also the lack of a mature political culture that prevents 
civilian supremacy in Turkey. In almost all public opinion polls, the TGS is the most 
trusted institution while political parties and politicians- regardless of their affiliation- are 
considered corrupt. Consequently, in the power struggle between the military and the 
civilians, the former has great leverage. What is interesting is that the superiority of the 
military is often taken for granted in Turkey. Apparently, the TGS has been successful in 
creating citizens that consent to its hegemony. The most influential manifestations of 
military supremacy in Turkey are the lack of accountability for, and the high degree of 
autonomy of, the TGS. Coupled with the ideological shield of Kemalism, it is not 
surprising that the military enjoys power and acts like ‘the big brother’ of Turkish 
democracy. Yet, on top of everything, the military, and even the public, makes a 
distinction between the state and the government and reserves the former for the military.  
Ironically, despite the military’s almost inherent right to be involved in politics, the 
public consistently opts for the parties that are least- liked by the TGS which makes 
Turkey an interesting case. 
 Turkey had three traditional military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980, as 
well as a different one in terms of its strategy in 1997, which has been called ‘a post-
modern coup.’ Notwithstanding the consistently regular interventions, the TGS has 
always allowed return to civilian rule, however under its guidance. Yet, preference for a 
civilian but conformist government is often referred to as courtesy of the TGS.  
 It would be misleading to assume that the interventions in Turkey have the same 
pattern, particularly in terms of internal dynamics. The first intervention of May 27, 1960, 
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took place outside the hierarchical structure of the TGS since it was organized by the 
low-ranking officers. In that era, the internal organization of the TGS was disrupted and 
fragmentation within the military turned into an issue. Consequently, the second coup of 
March 12, 1971, was almost the manifestation of the power struggle between the radicals 
and the moderates in the TGS. With the intervention, the disobedient groups were 
eliminated and the future organizations within the military began to focus more on the 
regime character rather than on personal ambitions.  
The September 12, 1980, intervention was the culmination of the military’s 
efforts to restore hierarchy in the TGS. Not only the command chain in the TGS, but also 
the autonomy of the military gradually gained strength with each intervention. The post-
modern coup of February 28, 1997, however, was a result of a successful public relations 
campaign to overthrow the government that the military despised. As the stages of the 
February 28 era unfolded it becomes clear that military acted with the Machiavellist 
motto that the end justified the means. 
 The two most important tools of the military’s ability to exercise power are the 
National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Policy Document (NSPD) or 
‘the Red Booklet’ as it is informally named. Clearly, each intervention helped both tools 
institutionalize and become indispensable parts of political decision making. Although 
the interventions contributed to the consolidation of the hierarchy of the TGS, the 
difference in points of view among the high-ranking generals indicate that the TGS is not 
immune to internal cleavages.  
In the war between the center and the periphery over the right to rule Turkey, the 
EU membership process seems to be the ultimate battleground. The outcome of this 
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process has a determining role in Turkish democracy’s path. If Turkey becomes an EU 
member after successful completion of membership requirements, the norms of liberal 
democracy might become irreversible and the proponents of the status quo would lose 
their upper hand in the Turkish state structure. Given the seemingly compatible nature of 
the EU’s principles with the establishment’s desire to reach the level of Western 
contemporary civilization, it would be normal to expect the support of the military and 
bureaucracy for EU membership.  However, as the extent of loss of power for the 
military becomes clearer, the covert, but occasionally overt- resistance of the TGS 
increases. Parallel to the long love-hate relationship of Turks with Europe, the high-
ranking generals give mixed messages about the EU’s agenda.  
Although Turkey’s journey to Europe started in the 1960s, until the Helsinki 
Summit of 1999 when Turkey’s candidacy was accepted, there was not a strong belief in 
the transformation of the society. Consequently, the struggle for civilian supremacy 
gained pace only after 1999. With the inauguration of the JDP government in 2002, the 
desire for change had peaked since the JDP itself has a lot to gain from the EU process, 
not least to keep its existence in Turkish politics. As a result of this enlightened self 
interest, the JDP accelerated an ambitious reform package to curb the military’s power 
while trying not to disturb the establishment which was already on alert. 
Notwithstanding the unprecedented reforms of 2004 to restrict the military’s 
power, the TGS still enjoys a wide amount of political and economic autonomy. For 
instance, the Chief of Staff is still not responsible to the Minister of Defense, but the 
Prime Minister instead.  The TGS is still not accountable for its actions.  The National 
Security Policy Document is still the main guidebook of politics and the National 
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Security Council still determines the agenda of the country. Indeed, more than the de jure 
prerogatives of the TGS, it is the de facto acceptance of the dominance of the military in 
politics that impedes civilian politics in Turkey.  After all, the TGS perceives itself the 
sole and rightful guardian of the regime and does not hesitate to raise its voice no matter 
how much demand for reform there is. The Semdinli incident of 2006, the punishment of 
the prosecutor who included General Buyukanit’s name in the Semdinli indictment and 
the reaction of the establishment after the shootings of the High Council judges all 
indicate that the war between the center and the periphery will become even more intense 
over the secular nature of the regime.  
Although democracy in its minimal definition is stable in Turkey, the 
consolidation of a truly liberal democracy is destined to remain a dream for Turkey given 
the weak commitment to the rule of law and the supremacy of the elected, as well as the 
conformist nature of the Turkish people at large. What is ironic is that despite the 
military’s overwhelming determining power over the fate of governments, the people 
consistently vote for the party that is despised by the TGS and the establishment at large.  
This mixed tradition in Turkish politics demonstrates the schizophrenic nature of Turkish 
society. In such a framework a strong engagement with the European Union and an 
irreversible change in the power practices in Turkey seem to be the remedy for the 
maladies of Turkish democracy. However, even more essential for the sanity and welfare 
of Turkey is the realization of a need for an open and unbiased discussion and 
redefinition of identity questions not only by the intelligentsia but the masses. Only in a 
country in which the people know what they desire, could the civilian supremacy be, 
permanently and irreversibly, instituted.  
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